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ABSTRACT 
 
TWO ESSAYS ON THE MITIGATING FACTORS OF CORPORATE TAX 
NONCOMPLIANCE 
 
by 
 
LUO Kim Wan Rebecca 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Corporate tax noncompliance is a serious problem in many developed and 
developing countries. My PhD thesis is composed of two essays to investigate 
various factors that mitigate corporate tax noncompliance by listed Chinese firms.  
 
The first essay examines whether a firm’s corporate tax noncompliance can be 
constrained by auditor quality. Past studies have shown that high-quality auditors are 
effective in reducing earnings management, which mainly involves overstatements of 
earnings. In this essay, I find that high-quality auditors are associated with better 
overall tax compliance by their client firms. In particular, high-quality auditors are 
effective in constraining book-tax-conforming noncompliance, which mainly 
involves understatements of both book and taxable income.  
 
The second essay examines the tax noncompliance behavior of firms since the 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in China, taking into 
account the influences of lower tax rates and more stringent tax enforcement. In 
recent years, many countries have moved away from tax-based accounting and 
toward adopting IFRS which increase tax noncompliance. At the same time, there 
has been a general reduction of corporate income tax rates as a means to increase tax 
competitiveness. Lower tax rates should be associated with decreases in tax 
noncompliance. Similarly, firms should be more tax compliant under a more 
stringent tax enforcement regime. In this essay, I find that the negative effect of 
book-tax delinking on tax noncompliance is significantly attenuated for firms that are 
subject to lower tax rates or more stringent tax enforcement measures. This essay 
also provides evidence that the effects of tax rates and of tax enforcement measures 
are more pronounced in the lower book-tax conformity period.  
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SUMMARY OF THESIS 
Tax noncompliance is a serious problem around the world, and various 
determinants of tax noncompliance need to be investigated. My thesis is composed of 
two essays, both of which investigate various factors that mitigate corporate tax 
noncompliance by listed Chinese firms. In my first essay, I examine the effect of 
auditor quality on constraining tax noncompliance. The second essay examines 
whether the use of lower corporate tax rates or more stringent tax enforcement 
measures is able to attenuate the negative effect of reduced book-tax conformity on 
tax noncompliance. 
Specifically, the first essay examines whether high-quality auditors, independent 
of their provision of tax services, can constrain clients’ tax noncompliance through 
their financial audits. I especially investigate the effect of high-quality auditors on 
book-tax-conforming noncompliance, which mainly involves understatements of both 
book and taxable income. I analyze 1,952 firm-year observations of listed companies 
in China from 1998 to 2003, and use tax audit adjustments as a direct measure to 
capture corporate tax noncompliance. Based on the empirical results, I find that 
high-quality auditors are associated with lower levels of total tax audit adjustments 
among client firms. Particularly, I find that firms audited by high-quality auditors 
have significantly lower book-tax-conforming adjustments than firms using 
low-quality auditors. This pattern holds in both higher and lower book-tax conformity 
periods. In extended analyses using sample firms in the 2008-2012 period, I find that 
firms using high-quality auditors and firms that switched from low- to high-quality 
auditors have better tax compliance. My findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity 
tests using various definitions of high-quality auditors and of tax noncompliance. 
My essay complements past research on the constraining effect that auditors 
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have on earnings management which mainly involves overstatements in financial 
reporting. The results provide insights into how auditor quality can constrain overall 
tax noncompliance, especially book-tax-conforming noncompliance, which often 
results in financial statement misstatements. My finding that high-quality auditors are 
associated with lower levels of book-tax-conforming misstatements suggests that 
such auditors are effective not only for detecting overstatements of earnings, but also 
for constraining tax-motivated understatements of earnings. This effect of 
high-quality auditors adds further credibility to their fair presentations of financial 
position in financial statements. 
The extant literature has focused on the benefits of adopting International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), including increased financial statement 
comparability and capital market effects. However, only a few studies have examined 
the effects of IFRS adoption on tax reporting behavior. My second essay takes the 
unique setting of China’s convergence with the IFRS in 2007 to examine whether the 
adoption of lower tax rates and stricter tax enforcement measures reduce the negative 
effect that a decrease in book-tax conformity has on corporate tax noncompliance. 
The findings contribute to the taxation literature by identifying the comparative 
effects among these determinants of tax noncompliance. 
 In recent years, many countries have moved away from their tax-based 
accounting systems toward adopting the IFRS, which increases tax noncompliance 
due to a reduction in non-tax costs according to the book-tax trade off theory 
(book-tax delinking effect). Many governments have simultaneously reduced their 
corporate income tax rates as a means to increase their nations’ tax competitiveness in 
the global market. A lower tax rate should be associated with reduced tax 
noncompliance. In other words, there should be a tax rate effect. Previous studies also 
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provide empirical evidence that firms are more tax compliant when tax enforcement 
becomes stricter (tax enforcement effect). Based on empirical data from Chinese 
listed firms between 2001 and 2012, I find that the application of lower tax rates can 
significantly reduce the negative effect that book-tax delinking has on tax 
noncompliance. The use of stricter tax enforcement measures also attenuates some of 
the negative effect that book-tax disconformity has on tax noncompliance. The 
empirical regression results suggest that lowering the tax rate is more effective than 
applying more stringent tax enforcement to mitigate this delinking effect. However, 
upon taking account of both the tax rate and tax enforcement effects, I find that a 
combination of these measures can more than offset the negative effect of delinking 
on tax noncompliance. I also find that the effects of both the tax rate reduction and 
tax enforcement increase significantly from the high- to the low- conformity levels. 
That is, both the tax rate effect and the tax enforcement effect are more pronounced 
when book-tax conformity is lower. These research findings are robust to various 
sensitivity tests.  
 This essay’s results should be of real interest to regulators and policy makers in 
many countries, including those that have not yet decided to move toward adopting 
IFRS. The essay provides evidence that the application of lower tax rates and a 
stringent tax enforcement policy are both effective ways to mitigate tax 
noncompliance, particularly in the case of developing countries that are departing 
from tax-based accounting and gradually moving towards the adoption of IFRS. 
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Essay 1:  The Constraining Effect of Auditor Quality on Corporate  
Tax Noncompliance 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Extant studies have shown that high-quality auditors can constrain a company’s 
opportunistic earnings management (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1993; Kim, Chung, 
and Firth 2003; Badertscher, Phillips, Pincus, and Rego 2009; Reichelt and Wang 
2010; Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang 2011; Christensen, Olson, and Omer 2015). 
Based on evidence from China, this essay examines whether high-quality auditors, 
through their financial audits, can also constrain a company’s overall tax 
noncompliance, especially in terms of book-tax-conforming noncompliance, which 
involves understatements of both book and taxable income. 
My study is motivated by concern about several characteristics of the Chinese 
regulatory environment that provide incentives for auditors to influence their clients’ 
tax compliance. First, in China, financial statements must be restated when there is a 
material misstatement affecting both book and taxable income detected by tax 
authorities after a tax audit.1 Restatement of financial statements is therefore an 
important measure of audit quality and an indicator of audit failure (Turner 1999; Liu, 
Raghunandan, and Rama 2009; Schmidt 2012). Reputable auditors should have a 
comparatively higher incentive to constrain their clients’ improper or aggressive tax 
reportings that are linked to financial reportings. These auditors hope to avoid 
restatements that could damage their reputations, even if they are not directly engaged 
to prepare their clients’ tax returns.  
A second reason for such concern by auditors is the direct link in China between 
1 Indeed, significant book-tax-conforming misstatements (such as recognizing revenue sooner or later 
than would have been allowed under GAAP, committing cost-related improprieties, or improper 
treatment of tax liabilities, inadequate income tax reserves and other tax-related items) are the most 
frequently identified reasons for restatements of financial statements in the U.S. (GAO 2002). 
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the tax expenses reported in financial statements and the tax liabilities reported to the 
tax authorities (as is further explained later). Auditors that fail to detect and report 
significant understatements of tax expenses and tax liabilities can be readily identified 
and these auditors may be blacklisted or sanctioned by the regulatory authorities. 
Such sanctions are widely publicized and can result in damaged reputations for 
auditors.  
A third reason for auditor concern is that aggressive tax reporting may result in 
substantial contingent tax liabilities. These liabilities can increase audit risk and affect 
the integrity of the overall governance environment. In addition, as most tax audit 
adjustments relate directly to noncompliance with tax laws, reputable brand-name 
auditors do not want to be affiliated with clients involved in significant illegal acts.  
Given that auditors in China have clear motivations to constrain client firms’ tax 
noncompliance, I hypothesize that high-quality auditors have a greater constraining 
effect on tax noncompliance than low-quality auditors, as high-quality auditors have 
more resources, greater expertise and are more concerned about reputation. 
Brand-name reputation is extremely important to high-quality auditors, as reputations 
are costly to build. Also, an audit firm’s reputation is an important justification for 
charging higher audit fees, especially in a competitive audit market (Craswell, Francis, 
and Taylor 1995).  
Starting from the late 1990s, China gradually moved away from its tax-based 
accounting system. Effective from 2001, China adopted the revised Accounting 
Standards for Business Enterprises, which marked a significant departure from a 
tax-based accounting system toward the adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) (Chan, Lin, and Mo 2010). This change has clearly reduced 
book-tax conformity and firms have had more opportunities to simultaneously 
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manipulate book and taxable income. This change in book-tax conformity provides a 
unique setting for an investigation into whether the constraining effect of high-quality 
auditors changes when book-tax conformity decreases from the pre-2001 period (i.e., 
1998 to 2000) to the post-2001 period (i.e., 2001 to 2003).2  
In response to this shift toward a different institutional setting, recent studies 
concerning the influence of auditors on tax reporting have focused on estimating the 
knowledge spillover effect of auditor-provided tax services on financial and tax 
reporting (e.g., Gleason and Mills 2011; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2011; McGuire, 
Omer, and Wang 2012; Donohoe and Knechel 2014). In this essay, I focus on 
investigating the constraining effect of high- versus low-quality auditors on clients’ 
tax noncompliance which affects financial reporting, independent of whether they 
provide tax services. Concerns have been raised over whether auditor-provided tax 
services may jeopardize an auditor’s independence in financial statement audits (e.g., 
Gleason and Mills 2011), and this setting allows me to assess the auditors’ 
constraining effects on tax and financial reporting without potentially confounding 
the effects of knowledge spillover and independence impairment.  
In this essay, I measure tax noncompliance directly by using the tax audit 
adjustments required by tax authorities (Mills 1998; Chan et al. 2010). Unlike other 
proxies used in past studies (Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010; Lisowsky 2010), tax audit adjustments measure the actual tax noncompliance 
of firms as detected by tax authorities in annual tax audits. Tax audit adjustments can 
2 The first stage of China’s departure from tax-based accounting system began in 1998 (Chan et al. 
2010). At that point, the Chinese government implemented a set of detailed operational accounting 
standards (the Accounting Regulation for Listed Companies), which formally recognized the need to 
relax the tax-based accounting principle. The gap between financial reporting and tax reporting began 
to widen. In 2001, China took another major step to further delink financial reporting from tax 
reporting. Chen, Sun, and Wang (2002) and Chen, Wang, and Zhao (2009) also use 2001 as a focal 
point to examine the effect of pre- versus post-policy changes on accounting practices in China. I 
confirm the decrease in conformity levels in my Research Method section (Sample Selection 
Subsection). 
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be classified as book-tax-conforming or as book-tax-difference audit adjustments. 
Book-tax-conforming adjustments are tax audit adjustments for misstatements that 
affect both book and taxable income, such as the under-reporting of sales revenue or 
over-reporting of cost of sales. These adjustments represent misstatements detected 
by the tax authorities that should have been detected by financial auditors. 
Book-tax-difference adjustments are revisions made due to misstatements of taxable 
income arising from violations such as claiming entertainment expenses in excess of 
the legal tax deduction limit, omitting taxable revenue that is recorded in the financial 
statements or claiming expenses that are not tax deductible. Unlike in situations 
involving book-tax-conforming misstatements, auditors are not normally expected to 
detect book-tax-difference misstatements, as they are not involved in preparing the 
clients’ tax filings. Thus, I specifically focus on examining the constraining effect of 
auditor quality on firms’ book-tax-conforming misstatements, in addition to studying 
the effect of auditor quality on total (overall) tax noncompliance. 
I test two hypotheses by analyzing 1,952 firm-year observations of listed 
Chinese companies that were subject to annual tax audits by the tax authorities 
between 1998 and 2003. I measure auditor quality by the auditor locality and size of 
the audit firms. Non-local or large auditors are expected to provide higher quality 
audits than smaller or local auditors (DeAngelo 1981; Chan, Lin, and Mo 2006; Wang, 
Wong, and Xia 2008; Chan and Wu 2011). I use the proprietary tax audit database 
compiled by Chan et al. (2010) to identify overall tax audit adjustments and 
book-tax-conforming tax audit adjustments that were imposed on firms after their 
annual tax audits. In an extended analysis, I examine the effect of high-quality 
auditors on tax noncompliance among sample firms between 1998 and 2003 and 
between 2008 and 2012, based on effective tax rates (ETR). I also investigate the 
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effect of changes in auditors on tax noncompliance. 
The results of this research are consistent with my hypothesis that high-quality 
auditors are associated with lower levels of total (overall) tax audit adjustments for 
client firms. In particular, I find that firms audited by high-quality auditors have 
significantly smaller book-tax-conforming adjustments than those audited by 
low-quality auditors during both the higher and lower conformity periods. In an 
extended analysis using sample firms between 2008 and 2012, I find that firms using 
high-quality auditors and firms that switch from low- to high-quality auditors have 
better tax compliance. My findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests using 
various definitions of high-quality auditors and of tax noncompliance. 
This essay contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence 
concerning the effect of auditor quality on clients’ tax noncompliance through 
financial statement audits, independent of the provision of tax services. Past studies 
do not deal with the effect of differential auditor quality on tax noncompliance, nor do 
they investigate how the effect of auditor quality has changed between the two 
book-tax conformity periods (Gleason and Mills 2011; Seetharaman, Sun, and Wang 
2011; Hanlon, Krishnan, and Mills 2012; Hogan and Noga 2012; Donohoe and 
Knechel 2014). My essay complements past research on the constraining effect of 
auditors on earnings management, which involves mainly overstatements in financial 
reporting (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1993; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999; Kim et 
al. 2003; Badertscher et al. 2009; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Chen et al. 2011; 
Christensen et al. 2015). This essay provides insights concerning how auditor quality 
can also constrain overall tax noncompliance, in particular book-tax-conforming 
noncompliance, which often results in financial misstatements. Such misstatements 
commonly involve understatements of earnings. As firms generally do not have 
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incentives to understate book income, overstatements are much more common than 
understatements (Lennox and Li 2014). Auditors therefore often make less effort to 
detect understatements of revenue or overstatements of expenses. My finding that 
high-quality auditors are associated with lower levels of book-tax-conforming 
misstatements suggests these auditors are not only effective in detecting 
overstatement of earnings but also play an important role in constraining 
tax-motivated understatements of earnings. These efforts add further credibility to the 
fair presentation of financial position in financial statements. 
My finding that the constraining effect of auditor quality on tax noncompliance 
is more significant at the lower book-tax conformity level suggests that high-quality 
auditors with more resources and better expertise are more able to constrain tax 
noncompliance than low-quality auditors when there are more opportunities for 
reporting irregularities. In fact, the move toward the use of IFRS reporting is an 
international trend, and China is not alone among transition economies in making 
such a move.3 My research results can therefore provide a useful reference to 
international investors and tax authorities in transition economies, especially those 
that are currently adopting IFRS, or are contemplating such a move. Specifically, my 
results highlight the need to improve auditor quality to accompany the move towards 
IFRS which reduces book-tax conformity. High-quality auditors help to ensure the 
fair presentation of financial statements and serve to constrain tax noncompliance, 
3 Many transition economies such as China, Russia and Vietnam have departed from tax-based 
accounting toward the adoption of IFRS in recent years (Goncharov and Zimmermann 2006; Phuong 
and Richard 2011). In Russia, the IFRS was endorsed for use at the end of 2011 and become 
mandatory from 2012. Since then, the use of IFRS is required for the consolidated financial statements 
of all companies whose securities are publicly traded, and for all credit institutions or insurance 
companies, subject to certain exceptions. In Vietnam, although the IFRS have not been formally 
adopted so far, some Vietnamese companies prepare IFRS financial statements as supplementary 
statements for foreign investors, in addition to the financial statements prepared using Vietnamese 
Accounting Standards. During the 2001-2005 period, the Ministry of Finance of Vietnam gradually 
adopted IFRS by implementing a total of 26 IFRS-equivalent Vietnam Accounting Standards in five 
batches. 
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which is a serious problem that has not yet been adequately dealt in many transition 
economies, due to their insufficient institutional frameworks.  
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the 
financial and tax audit environment in China. Section 1.3 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the research hypotheses. Section 1.4 presents the research 
method. Section 1.5 discusses the empirical results, and the concluding remarks 
follow in Section 1.6.  
 
1.2  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
1.2.1 The Financial Audit Environment in China 
Most audit firms in China were initially established by government agencies, and 
these agencies frequently influenced audit firms’ operations to help companies to 
meet various regulatory requirements (Lin and Chen 2004). The opening of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in the early 1990s accelerated the 
development of the auditing profession.  In 1997, the Ministry of Finance and the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued regulations to disaffiliate 
audit firms from their sponsoring government agencies, in an attempt to improve 
auditor independence and audit quality. This disaffiliation program was completed in 
1998. However, personal influence still exists between local government officials and 
local CPA firms, which often results in lower quality audits (Chan et al. 2006).  
There is keen competition in China’s audit market, with active participation by 
many small- and mid-size local audit firms and low market penetration by Big-N 
auditors (Li, Song, and Wong 2008). During my sample period from 1998 to 2003, 
the total market share of Big-5 audit firms in China was 27 percent (in terms of listed 
clients’ total assets). In China’s institutional setting, local auditors have greater 
10 
                                                                       
economic dependence on local clients than non-local auditors. Local auditors are also 
subject to more political influence from local governments (Chan et al. 2006; Wang et 
al. 2008). As most Chinese listed companies are sponsored or controlled by local 
governments, local auditors have strong incentives to be lenient and to report 
favorably on clients that are owned by local governments. Local auditors’ lack of 
mobility and the narrow geographical dispersion of their clients further reduce their 
ability to resist pressure from their clients and local governments. This vulnerability 
to pressure affects the quality of their audits (Chan et al. 2006). Therefore, the quality 
of auditing offered by local and non-local auditors can be significantly different in 
China. 
During my sample period, listed companies in China typically did not engage 
their audit firms to file tax returns, because their managers (being former officials of 
state-owned enterprises) believed that they were familiar with tax preparation work. 
Nevertheless, auditors were expected to conduct substantive audit work on tax-related 
accounts and disclosures including tax provisions to ensure the fair representation of 
tax-related accounts in the financial statements.  
Chinese audit firms are subject to legal liabilities in case of audit failure. 
The sanctions they may face include administrative penalties, civil penalties 
and/or criminal charges. In 1995, China adopted a new set of auditing 
standards that closely follows the International Standards on Auditing. These 
new standards provide auditors with detailed rules for professional behavior, 
with penalties for noncompliance. In particular, auditors can be blacklisted and 
sanctioned by regulators for failing to detect and report a client firm’s significant 
understatements of tax liabilities.4 
4 For example, according to the Enforcement Release No. 27 (2008), issued by the China Securities 
11 
                                                 
                                                                       
1.2.2 Tax Audits, Tax Avoidance and the Restatement of Financial Statements 
in China  
In China, the calendar year is used for both financial and tax reporting purposes. 
Firms are required to submit audited financial statements and annual income tax 
returns to the local taxation authority within four months of the end of the year. As 
there is no difference in timing between the filings of audited financial statements and 
tax returns, there should be no significant uncertainty concerning the amounts of tax 
payable that are reported in financial statements. As China’s tax system works on 
self-assessment, the tax authorities enforce compliance by carrying out 
post-assessment field audits (Chan et al. 2010). similar to the U.S., financial 
statements play an important role in the conduct of the tax audits by tax authorities 
(Graham, Raedy and Shackelford 2012).  
In China, most listed companies are restructured from previous state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Generally, the productive operations of a firm to be listed are 
carved out, and the unprofitable operations remain with the parent SOEs (Deng, Gan, 
and He 2010). The government and the unlisted wholly state-owned parent companies 
retain substantial control of the listed SOE firms with regard to their operations and 
CEO appointments. These government-owned listed firms have various motives for 
avoiding taxes. Although some government-appointed managers may prefer to pay 
more taxes for the sake of their political career advancement, they generally need to 
maximize profits and cash flows to attract more outside capital investment to their 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the Shenzhen Pengcheng CPA Co. Ltd. was sanctioned for not 
following appropriate audit procedures and failing to detect material misstatements in the financial 
statements of a listed company, namely the Hunan Hengyang Jinli Technology Agricultural Co. Ltd.  
(stock code: 600762) for the years 2002 and 2003. One of the material misstatements related to the 
overstatement of agricultural income eligible for income tax exemption (i.e., there was an 
understatement of taxable income) resulting in an under-reporting of income tax. The CSRC issued a 
warning and imposed a fine of RMB 100,000 on the Shenzhen Pengcheng CPA firm, with a fine of 
RMB 50,000 for each of its two responsible partners (CSRC 2008).  
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province or region. These firms must also meet certain performance standards to 
maintain their listing status, or to qualify for the right to issue additional shares. Some 
managers may even want to reserve more cash flow within the firms for their own use 
through tax avoidance.5 It should be noted that in China, the use of tax revenue 
collected by the government is subject to the strict supervision of the National 
People’s Congress, whereas the use of any surplus kept within the firm is entirely at 
the discretion of corporate management. This consideration may motivate local 
governments to direct their firms to keep more surplus income within the firms, 
instead of paying more taxes. In addition, recent studies find that 
government-controlled listed firms have strong incentives to divert corporate 
resources, or to tunnel wealth back to their parent SOEs or other subsidiaries 
(Aharony, Wang, and Yuan 2010; Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010; Lo, Wong, and Firth 2010; 
South China Morning Post 2013). To facilitate such diversions of corporate resources 
or retain more cash flow under their control, many listed firms adopt aggressive tax 
strategies.  
Although the main focus of tax audits in the past has been on foreign companies 
and wealthy individuals, some listed companies (government- or 
non-government-owned) are also subject to periodic tax audits. According to the Tax 
Yearbook of China (published by the State Administration of Taxation), there were no 
changes in tax audit practices or audit rates for listed companies over our sample 
period (SAT 1998-2004). Also, there was no tax reform or significant change in tax 
5 For example, the China National Audit Office (CNAO) conducted an audit on the financial reporting 
of China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO group) and its affiliated companies in 2010. 
COSCO group is a government-owned enterprise that controls a number of companies, including 
China COSCO Holdings Company Ltd., which is listed on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange (stock 
code: 601919) and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (stock code: 1919). According to the audit report, 
COSCO and its affiliated companies under-reported their operating revenue, which resulted in a tax 
underpayment of RMB 453 million (approximately US$73.06 million) between 2004 and 2009 
(CNAO 2011). The audit report also found that COSCO’s management had misused company funds 
for employee bonuses and management salaries. 
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regulation during this period. However, Chan et al. (2010) show that tax 
noncompliance increased as book-tax conformity decreased during the 1998-2003 
period. 
In China, financial statements must be restated when there is a material 
book-tax-conforming tax audit adjustment imposed by the tax authorities after tax 
audit (SAT 1998). In addition, the Accounting Standard for Business Enterprise No. 
28, “Changes in Accounting Policies, Accounting Estimates, and Corrections of 
Accounting Errors” (first promulgated in 1998) and a subsequent interpretation 
circular both require that material book-tax-conforming adjustments imposed by the 
tax authorities should be treated as material financial statement errors. Companies are 
required to make retrospective restatements to correct such errors, and to provide 
detailed disclosures of the reasons and amounts of adjustments in the financial 
statements in the year of discovery. A tabulated comparison must be included in the 
current financial report to show the pre- and post-adjustment effects on the accounts 
concerned for the relevant previous year(s). This tabulated report should include the 
book adjustments made to retained earnings brought forward, the opening balance of 
tax payable, income tax expenses, deferred tax accounts (if any) and reports on any 
other financial accounts that are linked with the tax misstatements. Furthermore, the 
auditors are required to issue a public announcement explaining the details of the 
misstatements and their effects on previously audited financial statements, with a 
statement of whether the restatements were made by their clients to comply with the 
Accounting Standards.  
 
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
1.3.1 The Influence of Auditors on Tax Noncompliance  
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Numerous studies have shown that high-quality auditors can constrain a company’s 
earnings management (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1993; Francis et al. 1999; Kim et 
al. 2003; Badertscher et al. 2009, Reichelt and Wang 2010; Chen et al. 2011; 
Christensen et al. 2015). It is generally expected that high-quality auditors will 
conduct more substantive audit work to reduce the risk of audit failures, restatements 
of financial statements and exposure to litigation. 
Past studies show that tax avoidance activities affect financial statements mainly 
via reductions in a firm’s tax expenses (Maydew and Shackelford 2007).6 As the fair 
representation of tax expenses and related tax accruals affects the true and fair view 
of financial statements, auditors need to understand both the financial reporting 
standards and the tax laws that relate to their clients’ tax strategies. If the tax strategy 
adopted by a client is so aggressive that it can trigger a tax audit and result in 
additional tax liabilities, the auditors should require the client to record a reasonably 
sufficient tax reserve or contingent liability to offset some or all of the associated 
benefits reported on the financial statements (Maydew and Shackelford 2007). In 
addition, if firms engage in tax-motivated earnings management by understating 
revenue or overstating expenses (i.e., book-tax-conforming misstatements), the 
effects on financial statements are more significant. Therefore, high-quality auditors 
who have more to lose in case of audit failure do not like to see their clients pursuing 
aggressive tax positions. This concern on the part of auditors reduces the likelihood of 
their clients’ tax noncompliance (McGill 1988; Klepper, Mazur, and Nagin 1991). 
During a financial statement audit, auditors review the company’s material 
6 Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills (2004) report that some firms use their tax expense account, based on 
their projected effective tax rate (ETR), to manage their fourth-quarter earnings (mainly upward) to 
meet earnings targets. Christensen et al. 2015 show that audit firms with industry expertise and/or tax 
expertise seek to constrain their clients’ earnings management through complex tax expense account. 
However, these analyses do not deal with auditor quality, nor do they relate to tax noncompliance. 
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transactions that affect the calculation of both book income and taxable income. 
Specifically, in assessing the reasonableness of tax expenses and tax reserves, 
auditors need to review tax returns, working papers and correspondence with tax 
authorities (Gleason and Mills 2011). Auditors also need to review intercompany or 
related-party transactions, which often have important tax implications. Audit firms’ 
tax experts are often involved in assisting audit engagement teams to assess the 
exposure of tax-related accounts as part of their audit procedures (McGuire et al. 
2012). These and other standard audit procedures that auditors perform for tax-related 
accounts are normally specified in the audit program (PricewaterhouseCoopers-China 
2012).  
During our sample period, most listed companies in China adopted the tax 
payable method to account for income taxes. A few companies adopted the tax effect 
method, which recognizes the effect of timing differences on income tax. Under the 
tax payable method, a company recognizes its income tax expenses based on the 
taxable income for the current period, without taking into account the effect of timing 
differences. In other words, income tax expenses reported in the financial statements 
will be the same as the income tax payable reported to the tax authorities for the 
current period. Thus, book reporting and tax reporting conform with respect to the 
income tax amount. This distinctive accounting rule facilitates the auditing of income 
tax-related accounts, as there is no deferred tax involved. This conformity between 
income tax liability and income tax expense also allows the tax authorities to readily 
compare the tax liability reported in a tax return with the tax expense reported in a 
financial statement (which is attached to the tax return). As a significant difference 
between the two reports will certainly arouse the concern of the tax authorities, clients’ 
tax reporting is inherently constrained by the auditor’s assessment of tax-related 
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accounts in financial statements during the financial audit process. As high-quality 
auditors tend to be more risk averse, we should expect their clients to have better tax 
compliance.  
The tax-related accounts in financial statements are informative for the tax 
authorities, and the reliability of these audited accounts can affect the depth of tax 
audits (Graham et al. 2012). There is evidence that users’ perceptions of financial 
reporting reliability improve with higher-quality auditors (Balsam, Krishnan, and 
Yang 2003; Khurana and Raman 2004). When the tax authorities use audited book 
income and the associated tax account balances to assess their tax liabilities, they 
have more confidence in financial reports that are certified by high-quality auditors 
(Hanlon 2003; SAT 1993). In other words, the auditor’s quality is one of the most 
important considerations for tax authorities in planning the scope of a tax audit. Thus, 
I expect firms audited by high-quality auditors to have lesser tax audit adjustments 
imposed by the tax authorities during annual tax audits.7 
As explained earlier, material book-tax-conforming tax audit adjustments are 
regarded as material financial reporting misstatements. The respective accounts must 
be restated to correct such misstatements in the relevant years in accordance with the 
Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises No. 28. Frequent restatements lead to 
negative publicity, which can seriously damage the brand-name reputation of an 
auditor, and may trigger possible lawsuits or auditor switches. Past studies find that 
the auditor turnover rate is higher around restatements (e.g., Srinivasan 2005; Wallace 
2005; Thompson and McCoy 2008; Hennes, Leone, and Miller 2014). Also, the 
development of brand-name reputation is costly, and the more reputable audit firms 
7 On the other hand, to recover more tax revenues, some Chinese tax bureaus may seek to focus their 
audits on large firms that normally hire larger or higher-quality auditors. Indeed, many tax bureaus in 
major cities have a practice of auditing at least one large company per year. However, I believe that the 
overall effect of such a practice is not significant, given the size of the Chinese economy. 
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can charge systematically higher audit fees (Craswell et al. 1995). Beyond being 
driven by reputation concerns, high-quality auditors possess better abilities and 
resources for performing financial audits than local auditors. These qualities also 
contribute to their effect in constraining tax noncompliance, and particularly in 
minimizing their clients’ book-tax-conforming misstatements. Thus, I formulate the 
first hypothesis as follows: 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, firms using high-quality auditors have lower levels of tax 
noncompliance, and especially for book-tax-conforming noncompliance, 
than firms that use low-quality auditors. 
 
1.3.2 The Constraining Effect at Different Book-Tax Conformity Levels  
Like many transition economies, China has gradually moved away from a tax-based 
accounting system toward adopting the IFRS. In a tax-based accounting system, book 
and taxable incomes are highly conformed. When the conformity level is high, it is 
likely that an auditor’s detection of a book misstatement will correspondingly reduce 
the probability of a tax misstatement. As such, it is reasonable to expect that an 
auditor’s influence on tax reporting will be more direct and pronounced in the higher 
conformity period than in the lower conformity period.  
On the other hand, when the book-tax conformity level decreases, the book-tax 
differences increase, because there is less need for company management to make 
trade-offs between financial reporting and tax reporting incentives. In that situation, 
the company management has more opportunity to inflate book income and reduce 
taxable income at the same time.8 The auditor’s role then becomes more important 
8 For example, a company may use different sales cutoffs, asset useful life and salvage value, lease 
accounting or cost allocation methods for book and tax purposes. These differences could result in 
book-tax-conforming or book-tax-difference audit adjustments. 
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and more valuable for constraining opportunistic reporting behavior and reducing 
information risk. In other words, investors, lenders and governments tend to place 
more reliance on the auditor’s efforts to identify and constrain the company 
management’s noncompliance behavior when the book-tax conformity is reduced. In 
view of the increased probability of book and tax misstatements when the book-tax 
conformity is reduced, high-quality auditors need to be more alert than low-quality 
auditors. In a lower book-tax conformity period, they should devote more resources to 
conduct vigorous and comprehensive audit tests to mitigate the risks of audit failure 
and of damage to their brand-name reputation.  
To summarize, it remains an empirical question whether auditor quality has a 
more apparent effect in constraining tax noncompliance at a higher or a lower 
conformity level. Hence, I formulate the second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: There is a significant difference in the degree to which auditor quality has a 
constraining effect on tax noncompliance at different book-tax conformity 
levels. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHOD  
1.4.1 Sample Selection  
To examine whether high-quality auditors can indeed constrain tax noncompliance 
and whether their constraining effect varies at different levels of book-tax conformity, 
I use the Chan et al. (2010) tax audit database, which includes information on the 
sample companies’ book income, taxable income reported in tax returns (before tax 
audits) and details of tax audit adjustments during the 1998-2003 period. In addition 
to the total amount of tax audit adjustments, I identify and collect the 
book-tax-conforming adjustments of each company in the sample, based on 
19 
                                                                       
descriptions of the nature of individual tax audit adjustments. Compared with using 
the ETR as a proxy for a firm’s overall tax noncompliance, the use of tax audit 
adjustments data allows me to more directly examine both the constraining effect of 
auditor quality on overall tax noncompliance and on book-tax-conforming 
noncompliance. 
I collect financial statement data and other firm characteristics of the sample 
companies from the China Infobank database, the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research database and the annual reports of the respective Chinese listed 
firms. I also collect auditor data from the China Infobank database, including auditor 
name, size, office location and type of audit opinions issued. Finally, I hand collect 
information regarding the political appointments of CEOs and General Managers of 
the sample firms from their annual reports. 
I begin with 2,739 firm-year observations from the Chan et al. (2010) tax audit 
data for the 1998-2003 period. I choose to examine samples from 1998 onwards 
because those financial statements were audited by disaffiliated audit firms, as 
explained earlier. As China adopted new accounting standards in 2001 that further 
reduced book-tax conformity and moved toward the adoption of IFRS, the sample 
period in this essay covers three years before 2001 and three years after 2001, which 
allows me to test the proposed constraining effect at two different book-tax 
conformity levels. In the pre-2001 period, two sets of reporting rules were partially 
delinked, and then the delinking becomes more complete in post-2001 period. 
Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010) measure the level of book-tax conformity by 
calculating the root mean squared error (RMSE) from a regression of current tax 
expense on pretax book income and dividends declared. A high RMSE indicates 
lower book-tax conformity. I estimate the RMSE measures for the sample firms in 
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each of the two conformity periods to validate the decrease in their levels of 
conformity. The results show that the level of RMSE increases from 0.0087 during 
the 1998-2000 period up to 0.0096 during the 2001-2003 period. A significant F-test 
rejects the null hypothesis of equal means at the 5 percent level. 
As explained earlier, Chinese listed companies during my sample period did not 
typically engage their auditors for tax filing services. Discussions with CPA firm 
partners, corporate controllers and tax officials in China confirm this practice. I check 
the annual reports of the sample firms, and find that only a few of them paid a tax 
service fee to their auditors. I exclude 28 firm-years in which such fees were paid.9 
Consistent with Mills (1998), I also exclude 447 firm-years with negative tax audit 
adjustments (or negative book-tax differences) to obtain more generalizable results.10 
I delete 276 firm-years with missing corporate information such as independent 
director ratio or ownership details. Finally, I exclude 36 firm-years identified as 
outliers with standardized residuals for tax audit adjustments exceeding three standard 
deviations from the mean in absolute value. My final sample consists of 1,952 
firm-year observations for the main regression models.   
 
1.4.2 Specification of the Regression Models  
To test the hypotheses, I develop the following two regression models (firm and time 
subscripts are suppressed for simplicity): 
 
9 Auditors that also provide tax services are likely to be high-quality auditors. Due to the potential 
spillover effect, high-quality auditors that also provide tax services should be even more effective in 
constraining tax noncompliance than those that do not provide such services. Excluding those few 
cases from my analysis will only bias the results against my hypothesis that high-quality auditors 
constrain tax noncompliance. Including these observations in the regression does not change the 
significance of the test or the control variables as reported in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
10 Negative adjustments represent special or peculiar situations for firms in terms of motives and 
reporting circumstances. Furthermore, firms with negative adjustments are tax compliant. 
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Tax_Adj (BTC_Adj) = 
 α0 + α1Aud_Quality + α2Delink + α3BTD + α4Tax_Method + α5DAccrual  
 +α6Opinion+α7Exe_Shares+α8Ownership+α9Bshare+10Overseas_Shares
+ α11Rights_Issue + α12ROE + α13Leverage + α14Age + α15Cosize  
+ α16Political_Connection +α17Industry_dummies + ε                   (1) 
    
Tax_Adj (BTC_Adj) = 
 β0 + β1Aud_Quality + β2Delink + β3DelinkxAud_Quality + β4BTD 
 +β5Tax_Method+β6DAccrual+β7Opinion+ β8Exe_Shares + β9Ownership  
 +β10Bshare+β11Overseas_Shares+β12Rights_Issue+β13ROE 
+β14Leverage+β15Age + β16Cosize + β17Political_Connection  
+α18Industry_dummies+ ε                                                     (2) 
 
1.4.2.1 Measures of Tax Noncompliance 
Tax_Adj and BTC_Adj are the two direct measures used to capture overall tax 
noncompliance and book-tax-conforming noncompliance, respectively. I deflate 
Tax_Adj and BTC_Adj by sales revenue, as most of the tax noncompliance and the 
adjustments concern revenues or expenses that are related to the level of the firm’s 
operating activities (Chan et al. 2010).11 This deflation also allows for cross-sectional 
comparison and reduces heteroskedasticity in the data. As Tax_Adj and BTC_Adj are 
bound to fall between 0 and 1, we estimate the models by using a double-censored 
Tobit regression.  
 
1.4.2.2 Measures of Auditor Quality  
Auditor quality refers to the ability of auditors to detect misstatements and their 
willingness to report the misstatements they identify during the financial audits 
(DeAngelo 1981). Different proxies for auditor quality have been used in past studies. 
The most often used proxy is audit firm size (DeAngelo 1981; Palmrose 1988; 
11 Due to the small magnitude of tax adjustment relative to sales and the presence of some zero 
adjustment observations, I multiply the original variables by 100 instead of taking the natural 
logarithm for my regression analysis. In the sensitivity test, I exclude observations with zero 
adjustment, and then take the natural logarithm of audit adjustments as the dependent variable. The 
results are similar to those of the main regression (see Table 16). 
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DeFond and Jiambalvo 1993; DeFond, Wong, and Li. 2000; Choi and Wong 2007). 
However, Chan et al. (2006) and Wang et al. (2008) argue that auditor locality is a 
better measure of auditor quality in China’s institutional environment. In view of the 
previous findings, I combine auditor locality and audit firm size as one measure of 
auditor quality. I code the variable Aud_Quality as 1 if a company is audited by either 
a non-local or a large auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
Following Chan et al. (2006), I treat an audit firm as a local firm if it resides in 
the same jurisdiction (province or equivalent in China) as its client, and if more than 
50 percent of its clients’ total assets come from the same jurisdiction as the audit 
firm.12 I follow past studies by using the market share of the year-end total listed 
client assets of the auditor to rank the audit firms according to size (DeFond et al. 
2000; Reynolds and Francis 2001; Chan et al. 2006). As the Chinese audit market is 
dominated by small- and mid-size audit firms (with a low concentration of Big-5 
auditors), during some years of the sample one or two of the Big-5 auditors were not 
included among the Top-10 firms. In considering that Big-5 firms provide a higher 
audit quality than others, I adopt a definition of large auditors that includes both the 
Top-5 Chinese audit firms and the Big-5 international firms. I expect non-local or 
large auditors to provide higher audit quality in financial audit engagements and to be 
better able to constrain tax noncompliance than small local auditors. Therefore, 
according to Hypothesis H1, I expect the coefficient α1 to be negative.  
 
1.4.2.3 Delink 
12 For audit firms with offices in different provinces, the 50 percent requirement for local auditor 
status is satisfied only if “every” office has local clients comprising over 50 percent of the office’s 
clientele (i.e., over 50 percent of its clients’ total assets come from clients in the same province where 
the respective office is located). If a firm has one office serving mainly local clients and one office 
serving mainly non-local clients, such firms are classified as non-local. This classification system is 
also used by Chan et al. (2006). 
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In 2001, China further departed from tax-based financial reporting and moved toward 
IFRS. When the rules governing the calculation of book income and taxable income 
become less conforming, firms are less tax compliant due to the lower non-tax costs 
for tax reporting manipulations (Chan et al. 2010). Accordingly, my sample 
observations should indicate more tax noncompliance in terms of larger tax audit 
adjustments in the post-2001 period than the pre-2001 period. I include the variable, 
Delink, to indicate the influence of the delinking of financial reporting rules from the 
tax rules on tax noncompliance. Delink is defined as 1 if the sample year is from 2001 
to 2003, and 0 if the sample year is from 1998 to 2000. I expect the coefficient of the 
Delink variable to be positive.  
I include an interaction term, DelinkxAud_Quality, in the tax noncompliance 
regression model of equation (2) to test Hypothesis H2. The coefficient β3 measures 
the sensitivity of the constraining effect of auditor quality on tax audit adjustments as 
the book-tax conformity level decreases. If high-quality auditors are more alert and 
devote more resources to reduce misstatements after delinking, the sign of the 
coefficient of β3 is expected to be negative.  
 
1.4.2.4 Control Variables  
In addition to the test variables, I include 14 firm characteristic variables in the 
regression models to control for their effects on a company’s tax noncompliance 
behavior. First, I include book-tax differences, BTD (pretax book income minus 
taxable income deflated by sales), as these differences are expected to be positively 
associated with tax audit adjustments (Chan et al. 2010). I also include the variable 
Tax_Method, which is coded as 1 if a company adopts the tax payable method to 
account for income tax for financial reporting purposes, and 0 if a company adopts 
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the tax effect method. Due to the complexity involved in determining deferred taxes, I 
expect the use of the tax effect method to provide more opportunities for tax 
misreporting. Thus, the respective coefficient should be negative. To control for 
earnings management that may affect tax audit adjustments, I include DAccrual as a 
measure of earnings management. I calculate the signed discretionary accruals 
(DAccrual) based on the modified Jones (1991) model.  
In China, all listed companies are required to submit audited financial statements 
together with their tax returns to the tax authorities. Financial reports with qualified 
audit opinions indicate that there are problems affecting the fair presentation of the 
companies’ operating results and financial positions. The tax authorities use audited 
book income as a benchmark for the measurement of taxable income in determining 
whether companies are under-reporting (Hanlon 2003). Firms that receive qualified 
audit opinions may be suspected of corporate tax noncompliance.13 For firms with 
qualified audit opinions, the additional reputation cost of failing to detect tax 
reporting problems may be minimal, and so the auditors may limit their investment in 
scrutiny of these companies. Thus, I expect companies receiving unqualified audit 
opinions to have fewer tax audit adjustments than companies that receive qualified 
audit opinions. Opinion is coded as 1 if a company receives an unqualified audit 
opinion, and 0 otherwise. The regression coefficient on Opinion should thus be 
negative. Following previous empirical studies (DeFond et al. 2000; Chan et al. 2006), 
I classify audit opinions as “qualified” if they are unqualified with an explanatory 
paragraph, qualified, contain a disclaimer, or are adverse.  
Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2004) find that executives who are motivated 
13 Graham et al. (2012) suggest that the contents of the tax accounts in financial statements affect the 
extent of the tax audit. Companies reporting low income tax expenses in their financial statements 
provide a red flag for the tax authorities.  
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by stock-based compensation schemes may be willing to pay taxes on overstated 
earnings to reduce the likelihood that their earnings manipulations can be detected. 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find that increases in incentive compensation for 
executives tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering. However, it is also possible that 
executives with a large percentage of shares may want to minimize tax payment as a 
means to maximize the after-tax dividend payout. Chinese companies seldom offer 
stock-based compensation to company executives. I thus use the percentage of shares 
held by executives (Exe_Shares) to capture the possible influence of executive 
compensation on tax noncompliance behavior. 
Local government-owned companies generally have a weaker financial 
condition and less accountable corporate governance. Thus, they may have greater 
incentives for tax noncompliance to reduce their tax burdens and to reserve cash 
within the company for future uses (Chan et al. 2006). To control for the effect of 
such government ownership on tax noncompliance, I include a dummy variable, 
Ownership, which equals 1 if a company is non-local-government owned, and 0 
otherwise. I follow the same classification as Chan et al. (2006), and identify a firm as 
local government owned if the largest shareholder is a local government entity that 
owns at least 20 percent of the shares. I expect the relationship between the 
Ownership variable and the tax noncompliance measures to be negative.  
Companies with B-shares (shares sold only to foreign investors) and with shares 
listed on overseas stock exchanges normally have overseas operations. These firms 
are more likely to engage tax noncompliance, as they have more opportunities for 
designing tax schemes among their different affiliated companies. However, the 
presence of foreign investors also commonly brings in new management methods and 
better internal control systems that may reduce noncompliance. I include two 
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variables, Bshares and Overseas_Shares, to control for these effects. Also, Chinese 
firms need to meet certain performance standards before they can issue additional 
shares. Therefore, rights offering firms may be motivated to report high book 
earnings to meet those regulatory requirements. These firms are therefore less likely 
to make tax-motivated misstatements than their counterparts (Chan et al. 2010). 
However, Shelvin, Tang, and Wilson (2012) find that rights offering firms often 
engage in greater intra-group income shifting as a way to lower their taxes and 
increase their after-tax book earnings for meeting minimum earnings thresholds. Thus, 
I include Rights_Issue to control for this effect.  
I include ROE (return on equity) to control for the effect of profitability on tax 
noncompliance. Companies with a low ROE are more likely to be susceptible to cash 
constraints over time, and they may be less tax compliant. I include Leverage (total 
debts divided by total assets) to control for the effect that a company’s borrowings 
have on tax noncompliance. Highly leveraged firms may have a greater need to 
inflate book income to meet their debt covenant requirements. However, Graham and 
Tucker (2006) and Lisowsky (2010) find that tax shelter firms have a lower leverage 
than their counterparts. Older firms are also more likely to become susceptible to cash 
constraints after they go public, and they tend to be less compliant with tax 
regulations (Murray 1995; Chen, Chen, and Su 2001). However, older firms may 
have built up strong reputations over time, and as such they can be more tax 
compliant to protect their brand-name reputations. I include a continuous variable, 
Age (number of years a firm has operated since its initial public offering), to control 
for this effect.  
Chan et al. (2010) find that large firms are more tax compliant because of the 
political costs they face, and because they have more resources to devise and execute 
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undetected tax avoidance strategies. I include the variable Cosize to control for any 
effect of company size. Also, the amount of tax adjustment imposed by tax authorities 
may be affected by a firm’s power to negotiate. Therefore I include a dummy variable, 
Political_Connection, which equals 1 if the firm’s CEO and General Manager have 
political appointments, to control for the effect of negotiation ability. In China, most 
of these political appointments come from local governments. I expect 
Political_Connection to be negatively associated with the level of tax audit 
adjustments. Finally, I incorporate a set of eleven dummy variables for different 
industries (Industry) to control for any industry effects on tax noncompliance. 
 
1.4.3 Selection Bias  
Company managers select their preferred auditors according to firm characteristics 
and other unobserved variables. These variables may cause a potential self-selection 
bias in my regression models if I ignore the issue of non-random selection of auditors 
(Maddala 1991). I therefore adopt a two-stage method (Heckman 1976) to address the 
self-selection bias of auditor choice. First, I use the following probit regression model 
to estimate a company’s choice among auditors having different levels of quality.  
Aud_Quality =  
θ0+θ1Delink+θ2BTD + θ3Tax_Method + θ4DAccrual + θ5Ex_Opinion  
  +θ6Market_Index+ θ7Indirratio + θ8Exe_Shares + θ9Ownership  
+θ10Bshare + θ11Overseas_Shares + θ12Rights_Issue + θ13ROE  
+θ14Leverage+θ15Current_Ratio + θ16Age + θ17Cosize  
+θ18Political_Connection+θ19Industry_dummies+ε             (3) 
 
In addition to the variables in equation (1), I also include two exogenous 
variables that are expected to affect management’s selection of auditors.14 I include a 
14 It should be noted that I use the previous year’s audit opinion (Ex_Opinion) in model (3), but the 
current year’s audit opinion (Opinion) in models (1) and (2), as it is more logical that auditor choice is 
affected by the previous year’s audit opinion. Deleting the opinion variable in all three models does not 
affect the main research results.  
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variable, Market_Index, to reflect the development of market intermediaries and the 
legal environment (Fan and Wang 1998-2006). The higher the index, the more 
developed the market. I expect that in well-developed localities, the business and 
legal environment is more complicated, and listed companies are more likely to 
engage higher-quality auditors for their financial statement audits. Therefore, the sign 
of the Market_Index coefficient should be positive. I also add the variable of 
Current_Ratio (year-end current assets to current liabilities) to the auditor selection 
model, because the financial liquidity of a firm is expected to affect its financial 
ability to engage a higher-quality auditor.15 I also include the control variable of 
Indirratio (the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of 
board members) to control for the influence of corporate governance. It should be 
noted that audit fees may also affect a firm’s choice of auditor. However, audit fee 
data were not available before 2001 in China. Thus, I follow Chen, Sun and Wu (2010) 
in using company size to proxy for the effect of audit fees on auditor choice as a 
control in model (3). In the second stage, I perform the Tobit regression on the tax 
noncompliance models of equations (1) and (2) with the inclusion of λaudit_quality, 
which is the selection bias correction variable. All of the variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. 
[Insert Appendix 1 about here] 
 
1.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
1.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and univariate tests on the tax 
15 The exogenous variables of Market_Index and Current_Ratio are both statistically justified to 
satisfy the exclusion restriction principle. These variables affect managers’ auditor choice decisions 
directly (i.e., the first-stage model) but they have no direct effect on the second-stage dependent 
variable.  
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noncompliance measures and corporate characteristics of the sample firms. Firms 
audited by high-quality auditors have smaller total tax audit adjustments and 
book-tax-conforming tax audit adjustments, smaller book-tax differences, a lower 
percentage of executive shares, are more likely to be non-local-government owned 
and are more likely to have foreign shareholders and overseas listings than their 
counterparts. Furthermore, these firms tend to be older, larger and to have fewer 
political appointments from local governments. As shown in Appendix 2, all of the 
correlation coefficients among the variables are well below 0.50, except the 
correlation between Age and Delink (0.58). None of the variance-inflation factors 
exceed 10, which is the point beyond which the threat of multicollinearity becomes a 
concern (Greene 2008). Therefore, multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem in 
our multivariate regression analysis as discussed below.  
[Insert Table 1 and Appendix 2 about here] 
 
1.5.2 Multivariate Tests  
Table 2 presents the results of our stage-one estimation of auditor selection by sample 
firms. An area under the ROC curve of 0.8083 indicates that the first stage is well 
specified to deal with the endogeneity problem. I find that companies in the lower 
conformity period (Delink), with a lower book-tax difference (BTD), located in 
provinces with more developed market intermediaries (MKT_Index), with lower 
executive shareholdings (Exe_Shares), having foreign shareholders (Bshares) or 
overseas listings (Overseas_Shares) and a higher current ratio (Current_Ratio) 
exhibit a significantly higher tendency to choose high-quality auditors than their 
counterparts. However, companies having more political connections with mainly 
local governments are less likely to choose high-quality auditors (Chan et al. 2006; 
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Wang et al. 2008).  
The first-stage results support the expected significant positive relationship 
between the two instrumental variables (i.e., Market_Index and Current_Ratio) and 
auditor choice. This result indicates that both variables have direct effects on a firm’s 
auditor choice (statistically significant with p-value at the 1 percent and 5 percent 
levels, respectively). To provide assurance that these two variables have no direct 
effect on tax noncompliance (i.e., the second-stage regression), I run an additional 
analysis to regress the error term from the second-stage Tobit regression models (i.e., 
models 1 and 2) on these two instrumental variables and on all of the other 
independent variables used in the first-stage test (Lennox, Francis, and Wang 2012). 
The results show that Market_Index and Current_Ratio are both statistically 
insignificant. This finding suggests that the exclusion restriction principle is satisfied, 
and that these instrumental variables are valid for the Heckman test. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 presents the stage-two Tobit regression results for the two tax 
noncompliance models based on 1,952 firm-year observations.16 The coefficient on 
Aud_Quality is negative and significant for the two tax audit adjustment models 
(Tax_Adj and BTC_Adj). These results support my Hypothesis H1 that high-quality 
auditors have a constraining effect on firms’ tax noncompliance. The auditor quality 
is expected to affect the depth of tax audits, as mentioned earlier. The State 
16 My sample includes firms that are selected for tax audits. Tax authorities do not audit every listed 
company. To the extent that audit adjustments are conditional on a tax return being selected for an audit, 
the inference concerning the effect of audit quality on audit adjustments could be biased. However, 
based on the same data set, Chan et al. (2010) find no such selection bias.  
Furthermore, in my extended analysis, which includes both audited and non-audited firms, I find the 
results (as shown in Table 5, using differential ETR as a dependent variable) to be consistent with my 
main regression results, based on measuring tax noncompliance by the variables of audited firms using 
tax audit adjustment (Table 3) and differential ETR (Table 15).  
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Administration of Taxation has issued various tax circulars to announce the 
implementation procedures for tax audits (SAT 1993, 2009, 2012). Based on the 
guiding principles specified in these circulars regarding the selection of tax audit 
samples, it is not expected that the auditor’s quality significantly affects the likelihood 
that a firm will have a tax audit (Chan, Chau, and Leung 2013).17 However, even if 
the tax authorities are less likely to choose firms audited by high-quality auditors as 
their tax audit targets, and if this leads to a negative association between audit quality 
and tax audit adjustment, this explanation still suggests the important role of 
high-quality auditors in constraining tax noncompliance.  
Table 4 shows the regression results with the inclusion of the interaction term 
DelinkxAud_Quality to test whether high- and low-quality auditors have significantly 
different effects in constraining tax noncompliance at different levels of book-tax 
conformity. As shown in the table, the coefficients on Aud_Quality are negative for 
both the Tax_Adj and BTC_Adj models, but are significant only for the BTC_Adj 
model. This result indicates that during the higher book-tax conformity period, 
auditor quality has a significant constraining effect only on book-tax-conforming 
audit adjustments. The coefficients on DelinkxAud_Quality are also negative, but not 
significant for either model. However the respective sum of the coefficients 
(Aud_Quality + DelinkxAud_Quality) for the two models is negatively significant, 
17 Tax audits are usually carried out by independent tax investigation teams representing the tax 
authorities. Selection is based on certain criteria such as the taxpayer’s financial and tax characteristics 
(e.g., firms with large operational scale, firms that report drastic changes in earnings, firms that report 
tax payable incompatible with firm size), industry characteristics (e.g., firms that report low profit 
margins relative to their industry average), and ownership type. Another possibility of becoming an 
audit target is through an informer (SAT 1993, 2009).  
 
The SAT announces its tax audit plan each year by issuing a tax circular to the local tax authorities. For 
example, in January 2012, the SAT released a tax audit work plan which laid down the scope for 
national tax audits and investigations for that year (SAT 2012). The circular summarized the guidelines 
regarding the criteria for selecting audit targets and audit procedures. The tax audit targets for 2012 
primarily included firms in certain types of industries (e.g., real estate, construction and installation 
industries), regions, and some large-scale state-owned enterprises (which represented major sources of 
tax revenue in their respective regions).  
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which suggests that high-quality auditors have a significant constraining effect on 
both total noncompliance and specifically book-tax-conforming noncompliance 
during the lower book-tax conformity period. 18 To the extent that high-quality 
auditors have a significant constraining effect on total tax adjustments in the lower 
conformity period, but not in the higher conformity period, this finding provides 
support for Hypothesis H2. The constraining effect clearly differs at different levels 
of book-tax conformity. The sensitivity tests to be discussed later provide further 
support for Hypothesis H2. 
To summarize, the results shown in Tables 3 and 4 provide evidence that 
high-quality auditors have a significant constraining effect on total (overall) tax 
noncompliance. In particular, the effect on book-tax-conforming misstatements is 
significant at both conformity levels. As high-quality auditors are more concerned 
about the risks of financial statements restatements and of damage to their 
long-established brand-name reputations, they have incentives to reduce 
book-tax-conforming misstatements at all times. The economic differences of using 
high-quality versus low-quality auditors in reducing BTC_Adj in the high (i.e. 
1998-2000) and the low (i.e. 2001-2003) conformity period are respectively RMB 
0.75 million (about US$0.12 million) and RMB 1.11 million (about US$0.18 million) 
per firm-year on average.19 Overall, these findings suggest that the need to avoid 
restatements of financial statements, the need to maintain brand-name reputation and 
the differential in auditors’ resources are the main factors that explain the significance 
of auditor quality in constraining book-tax-conforming noncompliance at all 
18 I exclude 108 firm-year observations that show a loss position, and re-run the analysis. The Tobit 
regression results are comparable to the main regression results given in Tables 3 and 4, i.e., there is no 
change in the expected direction or significance of the test variables. 
19 The averages of sales for my sample firms during the high and low conformity periods are RMB 
4,580 million (about US$747 million) and RMB 6,420 million (about US$1,048 million), respectively. 
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conformity levels. 
[Insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here] 
Regarding the control variables, Tables 3 and 4 show that firms with larger BTD 
have more tax noncompliance, as is consistent with the results of Chan et al. (2010). 
In addition, firms with more executive shareholdings (Exe_Shares), higher leverage 
(Leverage) and larger size (Cosize) have significantly smaller tax audit adjustments 
(per dollar of assets) than their counterparts. Larger companies are more tax 
compliant than smaller companies, because of the political costs they face for 
noncompliance. Large firms are also better able to have their tax avoidance strategies 
go undetected, because they have more resources to do so (Mills 1998).  
 
1.5.3 Additional Test for an Extended Sample Period (2008-2012)  
Thus far, I have focused my analyses on the years surrounding the point of change in 
book-tax conformity (2001). By focusing on this period, I have sought to address the 
effect of book-tax conformity on the relation between auditor quality and tax 
compliance. To further examine the effect of auditor quality on tax compliance in a 
more recent period, I use the sample data from 2008 to 2012 (the period following the 
2008 tax rate reform in China) to replicate the analysis given in Table 3.20 In this 
replicated analysis, the Delink and Tax_Method variables are not included, as there is 
no change in book-tax conformity, and as all firms must use the tax effect method 
during this period. Also, I use ETR to proxy for the extent of tax noncompliance.21 
Given the variations in applicable statutory tax rates within China due to various 
20 Consistent with my main tests shown in Tables 3 and 4, I exclude 74 firm-year observations that 
have auditor-provided tax services. Including those observations in the regression does not change the 
significance of the test or the control variables as reported in Table 5.  
21 The tax audit adjustments data used in the main analysis are from the proprietary dataset of Chan et 
al. (2010). This proprietary dataset does not cover the period from 2008 to 2012. Therefore, I rely on 
publicly available financial data to calculate the effective tax rates as a proxy for tax noncompliance. 
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preferential tax policies, a low ETR may be due to the granting of a preferential tax 
rate. To ensure that a low ETR is not due to a low statutory tax rate (STR), I use the 
differential effective tax rate (Diff_ETR = STR ˗ ETR) as the dependent variable in 
my analysis. STR is the statutory tax rate applicable to a given firm. The ETR is 
calculated as corporate tax expenses divided by pre-tax book profits, whereas the 
applicable STR is extracted from the annual reports (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). I 
have excluded those firm years with negative tax expenses or negative taxable income 
to obtain more generalizable results. A large Diff_ETR suggests aggressive tax 
reporting, which is indicative of tax noncompliance. 
The results given in Table 5 show that the coefficient on Aud_Quality is 
significantly negative, which indicates that the use of high-quality auditors results in a 
smaller Diff_ETR. In other words, firms with high-quality auditors are more tax 
compliant in the extended sample period from 2008 to 2012. As Diff_ETR is a 
measure of the firms’ overall tax noncompliance, this result is consistent with the 
main test findings for Tax_Adj shown in Table 3, and indicates that high-quality 
auditors can effectively constrain total tax noncompliance. In considering that the 
extended period (2008-2012) is a lower book-tax conformity period, the results 
shown in Table 5 are also consistent with those in Table 4, which indicate that 
high-quality auditors have a significant constraining effect on the total tax 
noncompliance in lower conformity periods (2001-2003 for the main test, and 
2008-2012 for the extended period). The results using Diff-ETR to proxy for overall 
tax noncompliance give further support to Hypothesis H1. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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1.5.4 The Effect of a Change in Auditor Quality on Tax Noncompliance  
To provide further evidence in support of the main test results (that auditor quality has 
a constraining effect on tax noncompliance by client firms), I conduct an auditor 
change analysis to test whether a change from a low- to a high-quality auditor results 
in better tax compliance in the years following the auditor change. As I do not have 
sufficient auditor change data for the original dataset (sample period 1998-2003), I 
conduct this test only for the extended sample period (2008-2012).  
I define a change from a low- to a high-quality auditor as a switch from either (i) 
a local to a non-local auditor (with less than 50 percent client assets concentration), or 
(ii) from a small to a large auditor (a Top-5 Chinese or a Big-5 firm). During the 
extended period, there are 163 firms that switch from low- to high-quality auditors. 
Based on these “good-switch” firms, I construct a sample of 489 firm-years, with 
observations one year prior to the change and for the two years subsequent to the 
change. I use a dummy variable, Auditor_Change, to test the effect of such a change 
in auditor quality on Diff_ETR. Auditor_Change is coded 1 if the firm-year is either 
the first or the second year subsequent to a “good auditor” switch, and 0 otherwise. 
Consistent with my expectation, the results in Table 6 show that the coefficient on 
Auditor_Change is significantly negative, which indicates that a switch from a 
low-quality to a high-quality auditor results in less tax noncompliance.  
I further conduct a test to examine whether a “bad auditor” switch from a high- 
to a low-quality auditor, results in higher tax noncompliance in the years following 
the auditor change (during the extended sample period of 2008-2012). As with the 
“good auditor” switches discussed above, I define a change from a high- to a 
low-quality auditor as a switch from either (i) a non-local auditor (with less than 50 
percent client assets concentration) to a local auditor; or (ii) from a large (Top-5 
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Chinese or Big-5 firm) to a small auditor. During the extended period, there are 111 
firms that switch from high- to low-quality auditors. Based on these “bad-switch” 
firms, I construct a sample of 333 firm-years, with observations one year prior to the 
change and two years subsequent to the change. Auditor_Change is coded 1 if the 
firm-year is either the first or the second year subsequent to a “bad-auditor” switch, 
and 0 otherwise. The results given in Table 7 show that the coefficient on 
Auditor_Change is significantly positive, indicating that a downward switch from a 
high-quality to a low-quality auditor results in more tax noncompliance.  
Taking the results of “good” and “bad” switches together, these two auditor 
change tests provide compelling evidence that high-quality auditors do have a better 
constraining effect on clients’ tax noncompliance. 
[Insert Table 6 and Table 7 about here] 
 
1.5.5 Robustness Tests  
I conduct a battery of sensitivity tests to examine the robustness of these research 
results as follows.  
 
1.5.5.1 Propensity Matched-Pair Samples  
As the Heckman two-step correction method for self-selection bias may be sensitive 
to model specification (Clatworthy, Makepeace, and Peel 2009; Lennox et al. 2012), I 
use the propensity matched-pair sample method as an alternative way to resolve the 
self-selection problem. Following Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011), I use 
the nearest neighbor matching method to generate a propensity matched-pair sample 
based on the predicted probabilities from the auditor choice model (i.e., equation 3).22 
22 I implement the following rules to match the companies that choose high-quality auditors with 
those that choose low-quality auditors: (1) If only one of the two companies adjacent to a company that 
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As shown in Table 8, there is no significant difference in the firm characteristics of 
the matched-pair sample between firms that choose high-quality or low-quality 
auditors. Using this matched-pair sample of 816 observations, I re-run the Tobit 
regressions on the main tax compliance models shown in Table 4. The results, given 
in Table 9, indicate that high-quality auditors have a significant constraining effect on 
book-tax-conforming adjustments in the lower book-tax conformity period, and this 
result is not related to firm-characteristics. Again, this result further supports 
Hypothesis H1. 
[Insert Table 8 and Table 9 about here] 
1.5.5.2 Alternative Measures of Auditor Quality, Book-Tax Conformity Level and 
Tax Noncompliance  
I also conduct sensitivity tests by varying the definition of auditor quality (i.e., 
auditor locality and auditor size) for the Tax_Adj and BTC_Adj models. First, I re-run 
the regression models using an alternative definition of local auditor. I treat an audit 
firm as a local firm if that firm resides in the same jurisdiction as the client, and if 
more than 20 percent (instead of 50 percent as in our main regression) of the total 
client assets come from the same jurisdiction as the audit firm. This modification 
raises the standard for high-quality auditors. Table 10 shows that the results are 
largely similar to the main regression results given in Table 4.  
Second, I apply a more stringent standard by redefining high-quality auditors as 
those that are both non-local (with less than 50 percent client assets concentration) 
AND Top-5 or Big-5 audit firms. The results given in Table 11 show that the 
coefficients of Aud_Quality are significantly negative for the two tax adjustment 
chooses a high-quality auditor chooses a low-quality auditor, then it is chosen as a match. (2) If both 
adjacent companies choose low-quality auditors, then we choose the company with the closest 
estimated probability. (3) If there is no company that chooses a high-quality auditor adjacent to a 
company that chooses a low-quality auditor, then it is dropped.  
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models in both the higher and the lower book-tax conformity periods. These results 
indicate that auditor quality is negatively associated with all types of tax 
noncompliance at all conformity levels. 
Third, I use an alternative definition of auditor size. Instead of classifying the 
Top-5 Chinese firms plus the Big-5 international firms as large auditors, I expand the 
definition to include the Top-10 Chinese firms plus the Big-5. Thus, high-quality 
auditors are defined as either non-local or as either a Top-10 plus Big-5 audit firm. 
This modification lowers the standard for designating high-quality auditors. The 
results shown in Table 12 indicate that the high-quality auditors have a significant 
constraining effect in reducing only book-tax-conforming adjustments in the low 
conformity period.  
Fourth, I use auditor locality (local vs. non-local) as the only measure for auditor 
quality. I define high-quality auditors as those that are non-local (that have less than 
50 percent client concentration in the province). The results shown in Table 13 
indicate that high-quality auditors have a significant constraining effect on tax audit 
adjustments in both the lower and the higher conformity periods (like in the results 
shown in Table 11). I then use auditor size as the only proxy for auditor quality. As 
shown in Table 14, the results indicate that large auditors also has a significant 
constraining effect only on total tax audit adjustments in the lower conformity period.  
Taking the results shown in Tables 13 and 14 together with my main results in 
Table 4, it appears that audit firm size is less able to discriminate auditor quality than 
auditor locality. As Big-5 firms have a relatively small market share in China, the 
market for large auditors is dominated by the Top-5 Chinese audit firms (Big-5: 20 
percent vs. Top-5: 80 percent). Over the sample period, most clients of the Chinese 
Top-5 audit firms were audited by a Top-5 firm that was classified as a local auditor 
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(non-local: 28 percent vs. local: 72 percent). It should be noted that according to Chan 
et al. (2006), the same audit firm can be classified as local or non-local, depending on 
whether that audit firm is in the same jurisdiction as the client, and whether it has a 
concentration of clients in that jurisdiction. Due to the influence of local governments 
in China, large local Chinese auditors may not necessarily provide high-quality audits 
(Chan et al. 2006). This factor explains the weak constraining effect of large auditors 
as shown in Table 14. However, when high-quality auditors are defined as non-local 
auditors only, the measure of audit quality is not diluted by the effect of large local 
auditors, resulting in more significant constraining effects than those shown in the 
main results (in Table 4). 
As an alternative measure of tax noncompliance, I use the differential ETR 
(discussed earlier) as the dependent variable to replicate Table 4 for the 1998-2003 
sample period. The results given in Table 15 show that high-quality auditors have a 
significant constraining effect on noncompliance in the lower conformity period, as is 
consistent with the results based on tax audit adjustments during the same sample 
period (in Table 4). These findings reinforce both Hypotheses H1 and H2. 
Furthermore, my results are robust when I take the natural logarithm of tax audit 
adjustments (after deleting all zero adjustments) as a dependent variable. The results 
of this test are presented in Table 16.  
Finally, I use the measure of RMSE to replace the variable Delink to capture the 
high vs. low book-tax conformity level during the sample years. Table 17 indicates 
that the regression results are largely similar to the main regression results shown in 
Table 4. 
It is also interesting to observe that for all of the sensitivity tests included in 
Tables 10 to 17, the coefficients of the interaction term (DelinkxAud_Quality) are all 
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negative, and are significant for Tables 10, 14, 15 and 16. These results provide 
further support for Hypothesis H2, that the constraining effect of high-quality auditors 
differs in different conformity periods (with a stronger effect in the low conformity 
period). 
[Insert Table 10 to Table 17 about here] 
 
1.6 CONCLUSIONS  
This essay examines whether auditor quality can contribute to constraining corporate 
tax noncompliance, independent of the provision of tax services. To my knowledge, 
this is the first study to examine the effect of differential auditor quality on a firm’s 
tax compliance. Based on a unique dataset of firms’ total tax noncompliance and 
book-tax-conforming noncompliance as detected by the Chinese tax authorities, I find 
that high-quality auditors play an effective role in constraining their client firms’ total 
(overall) tax noncompliance, which can contribute to the fair presentation of tax 
expenses in financial statements. The results also indicate that the constraining effect 
of auditor quality on overall noncompliance is more apparent in the lower book-tax 
conformity period, while the effect on book-tax-conforming noncompliance is 
significant at all times (i.e., at all book-tax conformity levels). The prevention of 
book-tax-conforming noncompliance is important, as this kind of noncompliance can 
lead to restatements of relevant financial statement accounts if detected by the tax 
authorities. In addition, a switch from a low- to a high-quality auditor improves tax 
compliance.  
To maintain their brand-name reputations in a competitive audit market, 
high-quality auditors devote more resources and effort to detecting misstatements in 
financial statements, including tax-motivated understatements of earnings. Future 
41 
                                                                       
research may explore further conditions under which high-quality auditors are 
associated with better tax compliance. For example, it may be interesting to 
investigate how foreign shareholders (Bshares) and overseas listings 
(Overseas_Shares) affect an auditor’s performance in relation to tax compliance, as 
these two variables are both significant in the extended period. 
For fiscal, social or economic reasons, tax authorities around the world are trying 
their best to improve tax compliance. This essay provides evidence that high-quality 
auditors can help to constrain tax noncompliance. Tax authorities can use auditor 
quality as a signal for tax compliance in selecting tax audit targets, whereas investors 
can rely on auditor quality as a constraint for tax noncompliance in assessing 
potential tax liability, investment risk and returns. Finally, many countries, including 
transition economies such as Russia and Vietnam, are moving toward the full 
adoption of IFRS (from a tax-based accounting system), which will reduce the level 
of book-tax conformity. My essay indicates that in cases where book-tax conformity 
is reduced, high-quality auditors will be even more essential in constraining tax 
noncompliance, and particularly for book-tax-conforming noncompliance. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample Firms (1998-2003) 
(n=1,952) 
 
 High-Quality  
Auditor 
(n=981) 
Low-Quality 
 Auditor 
(n=971) 
Test of Mean 
Differences 
 
 Mean 
(Standard  
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Standard  
Deviation) 
t-statistic p-value  
Tax_Adj 0.0039 0.0048 -3.12 0.002 *** 
 (0.0057) (0.0082)    
BTC_Adj 0.0004 0,0007 -4.78 0.000 *** 
 (0.0007) (0.0014    
BTD 0.0963 0.1241 -3.07 0.002 *** 
 (0.1224) (0.2537)    
Tax_Method 0.9776 0.9835 -0.95 0.342  
 (0.1481) (0.1274)    
DAccrual 0.0050 
(0.0894) 
-0.0002 
(0.0836) 
1.33 
 
0.183 
 
 
Opinion 0.9103 
(0.2859) 
0.8939 
(0.3081) 
1.22 
 
0.224 
 
 
Exe_Shares 0.0179 
(0.0418) 
0.0255 
(0.0724) 
-2.82 
 
0.005 
 
*** 
Ownership 0.1346 
(0.3414) 
0.0906 
(0.2872) 
3.08 
 
0.002 
 
*** 
Bshares 0.1019 
(0.3027) 
0.0669 
(0.2500) 
2.78 
 
0.005 
 
*** 
Overseas_Shares 0.0418 
(0.2002) 
0.0051 
(0.0716) 
5.39 
 
0.000 
 
*** 
Rights_Issue 0.2080 
(0.4061) 
0.2235 
(0.4168) 
-0.83 
 
0.404 
 
 
ROE 0.0642 
(0.1791) 
0.0564 
(0.3555) 
0.61 
 
0.539 
 
 
Leverage 0.4443 
(0.1790) 
0.4326 
(0.1811) 
1.44 
 
0.151 
 
 
Age 5.7428 
(2.3314) 
5.0627 
(2.4490) 
6.28 
 
0.000 
 
*** 
Cosize 11.8054 
(0.8669) 
11.7177 
(0.7924) 
2.33 
 
0.020 
 
** 
Political_Connection 0.3609 0.4305 -3.15 0.002 *** 
 (0.4805) (0.4954)    
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
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TABLE 2 
Probit Estimation on the Selection of Auditors by Client Firms (n=1,952) 
 
  DV= Aud_Quality  
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient z-statistic 
Constant  0.338 0.563 
Delink + 0.271*** 2.989 
BTD - -0.548*** -3.108 
Tax_Method ? 0.072 0.311 
DAccrual ? 0.644 1.868 
Ex_Opinion + -0.161 -1.606 
Market_Index + 0.052*** 3.430 
Indirratio + 0.183 0.568 
Exe_Shares ? -1.331** -2.469 
Ownership + 0.180 1.850 
Bshares + 0.262** 2.296 
Overseas_Shares + 1.232*** 4.699 
Rights_Issue ? -0.017 -0.237 
ROE + 0.181 1.256 
Leverage ? 0.326 1.561 
Current_Ratio + 0.058** 2.299 
Age ? 0.010 0.561 
Cosize + -0.064 -1.548 
Political_Connection - -0.143** -2.351 
Industry dummies Included, but not reported for brevity 
Wald χ2 177.84***  
Area under ROC curve 0.8083  
  
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The dependent variable Aud_Quality is coded as 1 if a company is audited by either a non-local (less 
than 50 percent client assets concentration) or a large auditor (i.e., a Top-5 Chinese or a Big-5 
international audit firm), and 0 otherwise.  
Industry is a set of 11 dummy variables for different industries.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2010). 
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TABLE 3 
The Effect of Auditor Quality on Tax Noncompliance 
 
 Expected (1): Tax_Adj (2): BTC_Adj 
n=1,952 Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant ? 3.176*** 0.527*** 
  (10.038) (9.355) 
Aud_Quality - -0.070** -0.017*** 
  (-2.573) (-3.566) 
Delink + 0.123** 0.007 
  (2.254) (0.749) 
BTD + 0.547** 0.044 
  (2.546) (1.695) 
Tax_Method - -0.189 -0.015 
  (-1.933) (-1.455) 
DAccrual ? 0.221 0.003 
  (1.084) (0.102) 
Opinion - -0.075 -0.008 
  (-1.205) (-0.731) 
Exe_Shares ? -1.164*** -0.049 
  (-4.381) (-1.456) 
Ownership - -0.004 -0.010 
  (-0.093) (-1.661) 
Bshares ? 0.082 0.003 
  (1.207) (0.304) 
Overseas_Shares ? 0.150 -0.005 
  (1.033) (-0.278) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.032 -0.006 
  (-1.079) (-1.323) 
ROE - -0.028 -0.012 
  (-0.329) (-0.931) 
Leverage ? -0.197** -0.026** 
  (-2.285) (-2.021) 
Age ? 0.005 -0.003** 
  (0.537) (-1.969) 
Cosize - -0.242*** -0.033*** 
  (-9.482) (-7.947) 
Political_Connection - -0.021 0.007 
  (-0.577) (1.078) 
λaudit_quality ? 0.322 0.014 
  (1.656) (0.519) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  9.648*** 9.185*** 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variables are total audit adjustments (Tax_Adj) and 
book-tax-conforming audit adjustments (BTC_adj), respectively.  
Aud_Quality equals 1 if the auditor is either a non-local or a large auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
λaudit_quality is the selectivity correction variable from the Aud_Quality selection equation.  
Industry is a set of eleven dummy variables for different industries.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). 
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TABLE 4 
The Effect of Auditor Quality on Tax Noncompliance in Different Book-Tax 
 Conformity Periods 
 
 Expected  (1): Tax_Adj (2): BTC_Adj 
n=1,952 Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant ? 3.122*** 0.527*** 
  (9.738) (9.258) 
Aud_Quality - -0.020 -0.016** 
  (-0.591) (-2.377) 
Delink + 0.193*** 0.007 
  (2.699) (0.574) 
DelinkxAud_Quality ? -0.122 -0.001 
  (-1.958) (-0.110) 
BTD + 0.525** 0.044 
  (2.445) (1.676) 
Tax_Method - -0.182 -0.015 
  (-1.856) (-1.437) 
DAccrual ? 0.227 0.003 
  (1.115) (0.104) 
Opinion - -0.079 -0.008 
  (-1.275) (-0.731) 
Exe_Shares ? -1.176*** -0.049 
  (-4.419) (-1.457) 
Ownership - -0.002 -0.010 
  (-0.050) (-1.646) 
Bshares ? 0.084 0.003 
  (1.245) (0.303) 
Overseas_Shares ? 0.158 -0.005 
  (1.080) (-0.273) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.032 -0.006 
  (-1.084) (-1.323) 
ROE - -0.023 -0.012 
  (-0.272) (-0.928) 
Leverage ? -0.196** -0.026** 
  (-2.272) (-2.022) 
Age ? 0.004 -0.003 
  (0.451) (-1.957) 
Cosize - -0.241*** -0.033*** 
  (-9.469) (-7.947) 
Political_Connection - -0.024 0.007 
  (-0.645) (1.066) 
λaudit_quality ? 0.340 0.015 
  (1.726) (0.517) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  9.69*** 8.92*** 
Aud_Quality +                    
DelinkxAud_Quality          
- 
 
-0.142*** 
(-2.900) 
-0.017*** 
(-2.850) 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The coefficient of the interaction term, DelinkxAud_Quality, measures the sensitivity of the 
constraining effect of auditor quality on tax audit adjustment as book-tax conformity decreases.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). 
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TABLE 5 
The Effect of Auditor Quality on Tax Noncompliance for the Extended  
Sample Period (2008-2012) 
 
  DV= Diff_ETR  
n=4,265 Expected Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant ? 0.153** 
  (2.252) 
Aud_Quality - -0.009** 
  (-2.309) 
BTD + 0.003 
  (0.416) 
DAccrual ? 0.003 
  (0.131) 
Opinion - -0.016 
  (-1.219) 
Exe_Shares  ? -0.001*** 
  (-6.401) 
Ownership - -0.004 
  (-1.058) 
Bshares ? 0.021** 
  (1.985) 
Overseas_Shares ? 0.046*** 
  (2.853) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.015*** 
  (-3.419) 
ROE - -0.279*** 
  (-11.457) 
Leverage  ? 0.075*** 
  (7.799) 
Age  ? 0.003*** 
  (8.328) 
Cosize  - -0.006** 
  (-2.237) 
Political_Connection - -0.007 
  (-1.888) 
λaudit_quality ? 0.072*** 
  (3.252) 
Industry dummies  Included, but not reported 
for brevity 
F value  29.569*** 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The dependent variable, Diff_ETR, is the difference between the statutory tax rate (STR) and the 
effective tax rate (ETR). The ETR is calculated as corporate tax expenses divided by pre-tax book 
profits (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  
“High-quality auditor” is defined as an auditor that is non-local (with a less than 50 percent client 
assets concentration) or a large auditor (a Top-5 Chinese or a Big-5 firm).  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). 
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TABLE 6 
The Effect of an Auditor Change (from a Low-Quality to a High-Quality Auditor) on 
Tax Noncompliance in the Extended Sample Period (2008-2012) 
 
  DV= Diff_ETR 
n=489 Expected Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant  0.421*** 
  (4.627) 
Auditor_Change - -0.020** 
  (-2.068) 
BTD + 0.004 
  (0.312) 
DAccrual  ? 0.028 
  (0.505) 
Opinion - -0.035 
  (-1.450) 
Exe_Shares ? -0.001** 
  (-2.501) 
Ownership - -0.013 
  (-1.441) 
Bshares ? -0.029 
  (-1.448) 
Overseas_Shares ? 0.034 
  (1.002) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.013 
  (-1.142) 
ROE  - -0.221*** 
  (-4.781) 
Leverage  ? 0.034** 
  (1.990) 
Age  ? 0.006*** 
  (5.773) 
Cosize  - -0.016*** 
  (-3.398) 
Political_Connection - -0.004 
  (-0.423) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  7.850*** 
   
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The dependent variable is the differential effective tax rate (Diff_ETR), as defined in Table 5.  
A change from a low- to a high-quality auditor is defined as a switch from (i) a local to a non-local 
auditor (with less than a 50 percent client assets concentration) or (ii) a small to a large auditor (a 
Top-5 Chinese or a Big-5 firm).  
Auditor_Change is defined as 1 if the firm-year observation is subsequent to the auditor change, and 0 
otherwise.  
Other variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010).
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TABLE 7 
The Effect of an Auditor Change (from a High-Quality to a Low-Quality Auditor) on 
Tax Noncompliance in the Extended Sample Period (2008-2012) 
 
  DV= Diff_ETR 
n=333 Expected Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant  0.506*** 
  (4.742) 
Auditor_Change + 0.019* 
  (1.836) 
BTD + -0.019 
  (-1.017) 
DAccrual  ? -0.058 
  (-1.132) 
Opinion - -0.077*** 
  (-3.419) 
Exe_Shares ? -0.029 
  (-0.735) 
Ownership - -0.016 
  (-1.448) 
Bshares ? 0.042* 
  (1.704) 
Overseas_Shares ? 0.015 
  (0.367) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.014 
  (-0.940) 
ROE  - -0.011 
  (-1.227) 
Leverage  ? 0.012 
  (0.623) 
Age  ? 0.004*** 
  (3.290) 
Cosize  - -0.021*** 
  (-4.625) 
Political_Connection - 0.005 
  (0.446) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  6.170*** 
   
***, ** and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
The dependent variable is the differential effective tax rate (Diff_ETR), as defined in Table 5.  
A change from a high- to a low-quality auditor is defined as a switch from (i) a non-local auditor (with 
a less than 50 percent client assets concentration) to a local auditor; or (ii) a large (a Top-5 Chinese or 
a Big-5 firm) to a small auditor.  
Auditor_Change is defined as 1 if the firm-year observation is subsequent to the auditor change, and 0 
otherwise.  
Other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). 
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TABLE 8 
Descriptive Statistics on Firm Characteristics for the Propensity Matched-Pair Sample 
(Sample Period 1998-2003) 
 
 High-Quality 
auditor 
(n=408) 
Low-Quality 
Auditor 
(n=408) 
Test of Mean Differences 
 Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
t-statistic p-value  
BTD 0.0949 0.0883 0.75 0.452  
 (0.1062) (0.1417)    
Tax_Method 0.9902 0.9853 0.64 0.525  
 (0.0986) (0.1205)    
DAccrual 0.0074 
(0.0858) 
0.0047 
(0.0735) 
0.47 
 
0.640 
 
 
Opinion 0.9142 
(0.2804) 
0.8922 
(0.3106) 
1.06 
 
0.287 
 
 
Exe_Shares 0.0207 
(0.0417) 
0.0177 
(0.0498) 
0.94 
 
0.348 
 
 
Ownership 0.0931 
(0.2910) 
0.1029 
(0.3043) 
-0.47 
 
0.638 
 
 
Bshares 0.0784 
(0.2692) 
0.0833 
(0.2767) 
-0.26 
 
0.798 
 
 
Overseas_Shares 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.000 
(0.0000) 
0.00 
 
--- 
 
 
Rights_Issue 0.2353 
(0.4247) 
0.2059 
(0.4048) 
1.01 
 
0.312 
 
 
ROE 0.0602 
(0.2363) 
0.0670 
(0.1097) 
-0.52 
 
0.599 
 
 
Leverage 0.4361 
(0.1633) 
0.4502 
(0.1794) 
-1.18 
 
0.239 
 
 
Age 5.3947 
(2.0797) 
5.2555 
(2.1955) 
0.93 
 
0.353 
 
 
Cosize 11.7182 
(0.8022) 
11.7449 
(0.7525) 
-0.49 
 
0.624 
 
 
Political_Connect
ion 0.4044 0.4167 -0.36 0.722 
 
 (0.4914) (0.4936)    
 
Note: This table shows the corporate characteristics of the propensity matched-pair sample firms. The 
univariate tests indicate that there is no significant difference in firm characteristics between firms 
using high-quality and low-quality auditors. 
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TABLE 9 
The Effect of Auditor Quality on Tax Noncompliance Using the  
Propensity Matched-Pair Sample (1998-2003) 
 
(n=816) Expected Tax_Adj BTC_Adj  
 Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant  3.331*** 0.511*** 
  (6.567) (5.758) 
Aud_Quality - 0.068 -0.004 
  (1.321) (-0.500) 
Delink + 0.128 0.022 
  (1.623) (1.248) 
DelinkxAud_Quality ? -0.121 -0.020 
  (-1.279) (-1.303) 
BTD + 0.857*** 0.019 
  (2.914) (0.796) 
Tax_Method - -0.035 -0.021 
  (-0.276) (-0.700) 
DAccrual ? 0.344 0.013 
  (0.882) (0.422) 
Opinion - -0.085 -0.001 
  (-0.983) (-0.119) 
Exe_Shares ? -1.701*** -0.078 
  (-3.640) (-1.828) 
Ownership - -0.048 -0.001 
  (-0.833) (-0.166) 
Bshares ? 0.053 0.009 
  (0.708) (0.523) 
Rights_Issue ? 0.032 -0.006 
  (0.649) (-1.119) 
ROE - -0.089 -0.050 
  (-0.669) (-1.414) 
Leverage ? -0.111 -0.043*** 
  (-0.889) (-2.809) 
Age ? -0.001 -0.005 
  (-0.061) (-1.753) 
Cosize - -0.251*** -0.028*** 
  (-6.190) (-5.022) 
Political_Connection - 0.028 0.009 
  (0.608) (1.107) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value      5.025*** 5.533*** 
Aud_Quality + 
DelinkxAud_Quality 
- -0.0538 
(-0.70) 
-0.0239** 
(-2.13) 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). 
Note: The variable Overseas_Shares is not included in this model, as no firm in the matched-pair 
sample has an overseas listing.
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TABLE 10 
Other Sensitivity Tests (Sample Period 1998-2003) 
A “high-quality auditor” is a non-local auditor (with a less than 20 percent client assets 
concentration) or a large auditor (a Top-5 Chinese or a Big-5 firm) 
 Expected  (1): Tax_Adj (2): BTC_Adj 
n=1,952 Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant ? 3.209*** 0.530*** 
  (9.984) (8.951) 
Aud_Quality - -0.004 -0.014** 
  (-0.127) (-2.133) 
Delink + 0.198** 0.008 
  (2.510) (0.540) 
DelinkxAud_Quality ? -0.142** -0.002 
  (-2.291) (-0.211) 
BTD + 0.503** 0.043 
  (2.279) (1.509) 
Tax_Method - -0.198** -0.016 
  (-2.042) (-1.530) 
DAccrual ? 0.189 0.001 
  (0.927) (0.031) 
Opinion - -0.082 -0.008 
  (-1.281) (-0.728) 
Exe_Shares ? -1.281*** -0.056 
  (-3.112) (-0.898) 
Ownership - -0.024 -0.011** 
  (-0.593) (-1.997) 
Bshares ? 0.097 0.004 
  (1.116) (0.307) 
Overseas_Shares ? 0.165 -0.004 
  (0.790) (-0.132) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.033 -0.006 
  (-1.102) (-1.310) 
ROE - 0.031 -0.010 
  (0.274) (-0.521) 
Leverage ? -0.178** -0.025 
  (-2.013) (-1.871) 
Age ? 0.005 -0.003 
  (0.414) (-1.721) 
Cosize - -0.249*** -0.033*** 
  (-8.310) (-7.379) 
Political_Connection - -0.024 0.007 
  (-0.568) (0.847) 
λaudit_quality ? 0.293 0.013 
  (1.132) (0.307) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  9.74*** 8.98*** 
Aud_Quality +                    
DelinkxAud_Quality          
- 
 
-0.146*** 
(-2.980) 
-0.016*** 
(-2.680) 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The coefficient of the interaction term, DelinkxAud_Quality, measures the sensitivity of the 
constraining effect of auditor quality on tax audit adjustment as book-tax conformity decreases. 
Aud_Quality equals 1 if the auditor is a high-quality auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010).
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TABLE 11 
Other Sensitivity Tests (Sample Period 1998-2003) 
A “high-quality auditor” is both a non-local auditor (with a less than 50 percent client assets 
concentration) AND a large auditor (a Top-5 Chinese or a Big-5 firm) 
 Expected  (1): Tax_Adj (2): BTC_Adj 
n=1,952 Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant ? 0.634*** 0.102*** 
  (15.125) (8.782) 
Aud_Quality - -0.197*** -0.030*** 
  (-3.895) (-4.777) 
Delink + 0.070 0.000 
  (1.282) (0.062) 
DelinkxAud_Quality ? -0.039 0.010 
  (-0.523) (1.146) 
BTD + 0.675*** 0.053** 
  (2.937) (2.062) 
Tax_Method - -0.238** -0.019 
  (-2.145) (-1.306) 
DAccrual ? 0.087 -0.007 
  (0.408) (-0.248) 
Opinion - -0.060 -0.006 
  (-0.958) (-0.620) 
Exe_Shares ? -0.878*** -0.032 
  (-4.832) (-1.356) 
Ownership - -0.048 -0.013*** 
  (-1.242) (-2.776) 
Bshares ? 0.027 -0.002 
  (0.369) (-0.214) 
Overseas_Shares ? 0.014 -0.016 
  (0.083) (-0.682) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.027 -0.005 
  (-0.813) (-0.983) 
ROE - -0.093 -0.021 
  (-0.757) (-1.090) 
Leverage ? -0.210** -0.027** 
  (-2.298) (-2.005) 
Age ? -0.003 -0.003** 
  (-0.378) (-2.420) 
Cosize - -0.231*** -0.032*** 
  (-9.746) (-7.897) 
Political_Connection - 0.012 0.009 
  (0.377) (1.651) 
λaudit_quality ? -0.028 -0.007 
  (-0.268) (-0.417) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  9.84*** 9.29*** 
Aud_Quality +                    
DelinkxAud_Quality          
- 
 
-0.237*** 
(-4.930) 
-0.020*** 
(-3.320) 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The coefficient of the interaction term, DelinkxAud_Quality, measures the sensitivity of the 
constraining effect of auditor quality on tax audit adjustment as book-tax conformity decreases. 
Aud_Quality equals 1 if the auditor is a high-quality auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010).
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TABLE 12 
Other Sensitivity Tests (Sample Period 1998-2003) 
A “high-quality auditor” is a non-local auditor (with a less than 50 percent client assets 
concentration) or a large auditor (a Top-10 Chinese or a Big-5 firm) 
 Expected  (1): Tax_Adj (2): BTC_Adj 
n=1,952 Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant ? 2.872*** 0.506*** 
  (8.363) (9.116) 
Aud_Quality - -0.005 -0.013 
  (-0.133) (-1.750) 
Delink + 0.083 0.007 
  (1.365) (0.618) 
DelinkxAud_Quality ? -0.052 -0.008 
  (-0.739) (-0.762) 
BTD + 0.560** 0.044 
  (2.553) (1.696) 
Tax_Method - -0.153 -0.012 
  (-1.552) (-1.179) 
DAccrual ? 0.196 0.001 
  (0.964) (0.045) 
Opinion - -0.074 -0.007 
  (-1.195) (-0.702) 
Exe_Shares ? -1.036*** -0.042 
  (-5.166) (-1.694) 
Ownership - -0.011 -0.010** 
  (-0.285) (-2.010) 
Bshares ? 0.086 0.004 
  (1.382) (0.374) 
Overseas_Shares ? 0.069 -0.010 
  (0.741) (-0.892) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.034 -0.006 
  (-1.133) (-1.349) 
ROE - -0.024 -0.012 
  (-0.289) (-0.911) 
Leverage ? -0.220** -0.028** 
  (-2.533) (-2.114) 
Age ? 0.023 -0.002 
  (1.796) (-0.890) 
Cosize - -0.225*** -0.032*** 
  (-9.679) (-8.002) 
Political_Connection - -0.025 0.006 
  (-0.717) (1.036) 
λaudit_quality ? 0.310 0.013 
  (1.552) (0.777) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  9.69*** 8.98*** 
Aud_Quality +                    
DelinkxAud_Quality          
- 
 
-0.057*** 
(-0.950) 
-0.021*** 
(-2.910) 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The coefficient of the interaction term, DelinkxAud_Quality, measures the sensitivity of the 
constraining effect of auditor quality on tax audit adjustment as book-tax conformity decreases. 
Aud_Quality equals 1 if the auditor is a high-quality auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010).
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TABLE 13 
Other Sensitivity Tests (Sample Period 1998-2003) 
A “high-quality auditor” is a non-local auditor  
(with a less than a 50 percent client assets concentration) 
 Expected  (1): Tax_Adj (2): BTC_Adj 
n=1,952 Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant ? 3.353*** 0.535*** 
  (9.991) (9.713) 
Aud_Quality - -0.114*** -0.021*** 
  (-3.326) (-3.387) 
Delink + 0.046 -0.003 
  (0.631) (-0.256) 
DelinkxAud_Quality ? -0.043 0.002 
  (-0.729) (0.268) 
BTD + 0.696*** 0.056** 
  (2.979) (2.177) 
Tax_Method - -0.179 -0.013 
  (-1.852) (-1.268) 
DAccrual ? 0.048 -0.011 
  (0.227) (-0.402) 
Opinion - -0.062 -0.007 
  (-0.993) (-0.697) 
Exe_Shares ? -0.854*** -0.029 
  (-4.840) (-1.240) 
Ownership - -0.055 -0.013*** 
  (-1.362) (-2.818) 
Bshares ? 0.023 -0.001 
  (0.413) (-0.076) 
Overseas_Shares ? -0.133 -0.028 
  (-0.891) (-1.709) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.031 -0.006 
  (-1.044) (-1.351) 
ROE - -0.071 -0.015 
  (-0.892) (-1.147) 
Leverage ? -0.193** -0.025 
  (-2.198) (-1.958) 
Age ? 0.000 -0.003 
  (0.039) (-1.766) 
Cosize - -0.222*** -0.031*** 
  (-7.666) (-7.554) 
Political_Connection - 0.019 0.010 
  (0.623) (1.756) 
λaudit_quality ? -0.149 -0.021 
  (-1.090) (-1.229) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  9.28*** 8.98*** 
Aud_Quality +                    
DelinkxAud_Quality          
- 
 
-0.157*** 
(-3.430) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.360) 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The coefficient of the interaction term, DelinkxAud_Quality, measures the sensitivity of the 
constraining effect of auditor quality on tax audit adjustment as book-tax conformity decreases.  
Aud_Quality equals 1 if the auditor is a high-quality auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010).
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TABLE 14 
Other Sensitivity Tests (Sample Period 1998-2003) 
 
A “high-quality auditor” is a large auditor (a Top-5 Chinese or a Big-5 firm) 
 Expected  (1): Tax_Adj (2): BTC_Adj 
n=1,952 Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant ? 2.355*** 0.446*** 
  (4.335) (5.668) 
Aud_Quality - 0.043 -0.008 
  (0.997) (-1.413) 
Delink + 0.078 0.001 
  (1.863) (0.079) 
DelinkxAud_Quality ? -0.149** -0.001 
  (-2.334) (-0.107) 
BTD + 0.628*** 0.049 
  (2.786) (1.873) 
Tax_Method - -0.222** -0.019 
  (-2.292) (-1.771) 
DAccrual ? 0.110 -0.004 
  (0.536) (-0.157) 
Opinion - -0.068 -0.007 
  (-1.091) (-0.720) 
Exe_Shares ? -1.014*** -0.044 
  (-4.921) (-1.694) 
Ownership - -0.038 -0.012** 
  (-1.004) (-2.470) 
Bshares ? 0.079 0.005 
  (1.274) (0.499) 
Overseas_Shares ? 0.045 -0.008 
  (0.468) (-0.715) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.046 -0.008 
  (-1.457) (-1.602) 
ROE - 0.060 -0.004 
  (0.576) (-0.266) 
Leverage ? -0.192** -0.025 
  (-2.228) (-1.911) 
Age ? 0.009 -0.002 
  (0.807) (-1.255) 
Cosize - -0.214*** -0.030*** 
  (-9.204) (-7.728) 
Political_Connection - 0.005 0.008 
  (0.158) (1.370) 
λaudit_quality ? 0.112 0.009 
  (1.851) (1.047) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  9.71*** 9.41*** 
Aud_Quality +                    
DelinkxAud_Quality          
- 
 
-0.106*** 
(-2.210) 
-0.009*** 
(-1.720) 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The coefficient of the interaction term, DelinkxAud_Quality, measures the sensitivity of the 
constraining effect of auditor quality on tax audit adjustment as book-tax conformity decreases.  
Aud_Quality equals 1 if the auditor is a high-quality auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010).
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TABLE 15 
Other Sensitivity Tests (Sample Period 1998-2003) 
 
Tax Noncompliance is measured by the differential effective tax rate 
 Expected  Diff_ETR 
n=1,952 Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant ? 0.122 
  (0.978) 
Aud_Quality - 0.005 
  (0.655) 
Delink + -0.037 
  (-1.455) 
DelinkxAud_Quality ? -0.061*** 
  (-2.896) 
BTD + 0.251*** 
  (5.094) 
Tax_Method - -0.023 
  (-0.961) 
DAccrual ? -0.132** 
  (-2.143) 
Opinion - 0.028 
  (0.421) 
Exe_Shares ? -0.392*** 
  (-4.331) 
Ownership - -0.008 
  (-0.716) 
Bshares ? -0.032** 
  (-2.112) 
Overseas_Shares ? -0.124*** 
  (-3.627) 
Rights_Issue ? 0.006 
  (0.729) 
ROE - -0.081*** 
  (-4.585) 
Leverage ? 0.036 
  (0.702) 
Age ? 0.002 
  (0.652) 
Cosize - -0.022 
  (1.747) 
Political_Connection - 0.062 
  (0.674) 
λaudit_quality ? 0.234 
  (1.520) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  9.527 
Aud_Quality +                    
DelinkxAud_Quality          
-
 
-0.056*** 
(-2.550) 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The coefficient of the interaction term, DelinkxAud_Quality, measures the sensitivity of the 
constraining effect of auditor quality on tax audit adjustment as book-tax conformity decreases.  
Aud_Quality equals 1 if the auditor is a high-quality auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010). 
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TABLE 16 
Other Sensitivity Tests (Sample Period 1998-2003) 
 
Natural log of tax audit adjustments as a dependent variable 
 Expected  (1): Tax_Adj (2): BTC_Adj 
n=1,952 Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant ? 6.857*** 7.906*** 
  (11.968) (9.656) 
Aud_Quality - 0.087 -0.171 
  (1.222) (-1.904) 
Delink + 0.465*** 0.245 
  (4.731) (1.866) 
DelinkxAud_Quality ? -0.377*** -0.049 
  (-3.554) (-0.349) 
BTD + 0.772*** 0.878*** 
  (4.224) (3.841) 
Tax_Method - -0.290 0.302 
  (-1.510) (1.195) 
DAccrual ? 0.301 -0.524 
  (0.953) (-1.245) 
Opinion - -0.093 -0.159 
  (-1.091) (-1.338) 
Exe_Shares ? -1.846*** 0.413 
  (-3.234) (0.614) 
Ownership - -0.116 -0.166 
  (-1.222) (-1.411) 
Bshares ? -0.045 -0.268 
  (-0.389) (-1.853) 
Overseas_Shares ? -0.411 -0.873*** 
  (-1.529) (-2.657) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.051 -0.002 
  (-0.779) (-0.028) 
ROE - -0.114 -0.259 
  (-1.138) (-1.871) 
Leverage ? -0.671*** -0.648*** 
  (-4.297) (-3.170) 
Age ? -0.063*** -0.102*** 
  (-3.656) (-4.883) 
Cosize - -0.614*** -0.862*** 
  (-15.604) (-18.307) 
Political_Connection - 0.003 0.058 
  (0.041) (0.707) 
λaudit_quality ? -0.467 -0.608 
  (-1.602) (-1.525) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  24.85*** 24.68*** 
Aud_Quality +                    
DelinkxAud_Quality          
- 
 
-0.290*** 
(-3.680) 
-0.220*** 
(-2.020) 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The coefficient of the interaction term, DelinkxAud_Quality, measures the sensitivity of the 
constraining effect of auditor quality on tax audit adjustment as book-tax conformity decreases.  
Aud_Quality equals 1 if the auditor is a high-quality auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010).
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TABLE 17 
Other Sensitivity Tests (Sample Period 1998-2003) 
Book-tax conformity level is measured by the variable RMSE 
 Expected  (1): Tax_Adj (2): BTC_Adj 
n=1,952 Sign Coeff/(t-statistic) Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Constant ? 3.167*** 0.519*** 
  (10.373) (9.021) 
Aud_Quality - -0.034 -0.017*** 
  (-1.178) (-2.936) 
RMSE + 0.152** 0.003 
  (2.103) (0.286) 
RMSExAud_Quality ? -0.102 0.001 
  (-1.461) (0.087) 
BTD + 0.393** 0.043 
  (2.463) (1.622) 
Tax_Method - -0.187 -0.014 
  (-1.950) (-1.351) 
DAccrual ? 0.213 -0.001 
  (1.326) (-0.048) 
Opinion - -0.095 -0.008 
  (-1.530) (-0.740) 
Exe_Shares ? -1.012*** -0.054 
  (-4.028) (-1.535) 
Ownership - -0.020 -0.009 
  (-0.481) (-1.578) 
Bshares ? 0.059 0.003 
  (0.890) (0.323) 
Overseas_Shares ? 0.059 -0.002 
  (0.443) (-0.104) 
Rights_Issue ? -0.019 -0.006 
  (-0.656) (-1.342) 
ROE - -0.062 -0.013 
  (-0.758) (-0.952) 
Leverage ? -0.205*** -0.028** 
  (-2.670) (-2.135) 
Age ? 0.001 -0.002 
  (0.092) (-1.444) 
Cosize - -0.223*** -0.032*** 
  (-10.209) (-7.946) 
Political_Connection - -0.043 0.007 
  (-1.256) (1.051) 
λaudit_quality ? 0.178 0.020 
  (0.998) (0.675) 
Industry dummies ? Included, but not reported for brevity 
F value  9.47 8.68 
Aud_Quality +                    
RMSExAud_Quality          
- 
 
-0.136** 
(-2.230) 
-0.016** 
(-2.090) 
 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
The coefficient of the interaction term, RMSExAud_Quality, measures the sensitivity of the 
constraining effect of auditor quality on tax audit adjustment as book-tax conformity decreases. 
Aud_Quality equals 1 if the auditor is a high-quality auditor, and 0 otherwise.  
RMSE is coded as 1 if the value is higher than the sample mean, and 0 if lower than the sample mean. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
Standard errors are clustered by both firm and year (Gow et al. 2010).
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APPENDIX 1 
Definition of Variables 
 
Tax_Adj = total tax audit adjustments required by the Chinese tax 
authorities for tax noncompliance detected, deflated by sales 
revenue. 
BTC_Adj = book-tax-conforming tax audit adjustments deflated by sales 
revenue. 
Diff_ETR = difference between the statutory tax rate (STR) and the 
effective tax rate (ETR). 
Aud_Quality = 1 if the auditor is a non-local or a large auditor (a Top-5 
Chinese audit firm or a Big-5 firm). 
Delink = 1 if the sample year is from 2001 to 2003 (i.e., the lower 
book-tax conformity period), 0 if the sample year is from 1998 
to 2000 (i.e., the higher book-tax conformity period). 
BTD = pretax book income minus taxable income deflated by sales 
revenue. 
Tax_Method = 1 if a company adopts the tax payable method for financial 
reporting purposes, 0 if a company adopts the tax effect 
method. 
DAccrual = discretionary accruals of a company based on the modified 
Jones (1991) model. 
Opinion = 1 if a company receives an unqualified audit opinion in the 
year, 0 otherwise. 
Ex_Opinion = 1 if a company receives an unqualified audit opinion in the 
previous year, 0 otherwise. 
Market_Index = index reflecting the development of market intermediaries and 
legal environment in different provinces of China based on Fan 
and Wang (1998-2006). A higher index suggests a more 
developed market.   
Indirratio = number of independent directors over the total number of 
directors on the board. 
Exe_Shares = number of shares held by senior executives divided by total 
number of shares of the company at the end of the year. 
Ownership = 1 if a company is non-local government-owned, 0 otherwise 
Bshares = 1 if a company has foreign shareholders, 0 otherwise. 
Overseas_Shares = 1 if a company has shares listed in an overseas stock exchange, 
0 otherwise. 
Rights_Issue = 1 if a company raises additional capital in the succeeding year, 
0 otherwise. 
ROE = the ratio of net income before tax to equity. 
Leverage = total debts divided by total assets at the end of the year. 
Current_Ratio = the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
Age = number of years of operation since the initial public offering of 
the firm. 
Cosize = the natural logarithm of a company’s year-end total assets. 
Political_Connection = 1 if both the Chief Executive Officer and the General Manager 
of a firm have political appointments in China, 0 otherwise. 
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APPENDIX 2 Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Independent Variables Used in the Main Regression 
Coeff/p-value (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Aud_Quality  1                               
                               
(2) BTD  -.070 1                             
.002                              
(3) Delink  .128 .049 1                           
.000 .031                            
(4) Tax_Method  -.022 .004 -.011 1                         
.342 .854 .621                          
(5) DAccrual  .030 -.003 -.011 .049 1                       
.183 .901 .638 .031                        
(6) Opinion  .028 -.111 .084 -.021 .031 1                     
.224 .000 .000 .344 .171                      
(7) Exe_Shares  -.064 .000 -.069 .041 .015 -.022 1                   
.005 .988 .002 .067 .519 .337                    
(8) Ownership  .069 -.045 -.046 -.067 -.014 .025 -.051 1                 
.002 .049 .044 .003 .550 .276 .025                  
(9) Bshares  .063 -.005 .002 -.064 -.087 -.005 -.013 -.015 1               
.005 .823 .917 .005 .000 .815 .558 .504                
(10) Overseas_ 
Shares 
.121 .000 .022 -.174 -.052 -.028 -.053 .169 -.047 1             
.000 .992 .329 .000 .021 .210 .018 .000 .037              
(11) Rights_Issue  -.019 -.031 -.073 .002 .066 .055 .041 .010 -.029 -.040 1           
.404 .167 .001 .938 .003 .015 .068 .657 .193 .074            
(12) ROE  .014 -.046 -.100 -.019 .108 .150 -.014 .015 -.008 -.036 .087 1         
.539 .044 .000 .399 .000 .000 .530 .498 .729 .109 .000          
(13) Leverage  .033 .059 .110 .023 -.008 -.184 .025 .027 -.009 .025 -.030 -.152 1       
.151 .009 .000 .317 .732 .000 .272 .231 .705 .269 .189 .000        
(14) Age  .141 .094 .580 -.046 -.042 .010 -.089 .005 .219 .008 -.080 -.085 .212 1     
.000 .000 .000 .042 .061 .658 .000 .824 .000 .731 .000 .000 .000      
(15) Cosize  .053 -.151 .184 -.184 .005 .060 -.046 .089 .186 .215 .030 .026 .176 .191 1   
.020 .000 .000 .000 .834 .008 .043 .000 .000 .000 .180 .247 .000 .000    
(16) Political_ 
Connection  
-.071 .021 .046 .031 -.046 -.002 .002 -.043 -.054 -.036 -.009 .007 .003 -.023 .023 1 
.002 .356 .040 .177 .042 .943 .930 .057 .018 .113 .694 .742 .907 .317 .319  
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Essay 2: The Effects of Book-Tax Delinking, Tax Rates and Tax Enforcement on 
Corporate Tax Noncompliance 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
To bring domestic accounting regulations into harmony with international practices, 
China has gradually relaxed the traditional link between financial and tax reporting. 
This process began in 1998, with further book-tax delinking in 2001. Book-tax 
delinking provides more opportunities for management to practice both upward 
earnings management and aggressive tax noncompliance (i.e. downward taxable 
income) at the same time. In 2007, China took another step away from its traditional 
tax-based accounting system by formally adopting the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). This move significantly reduced book-tax conformity.  
Chan, Lin, and Mo (2010) use a proprietary database covering the 1996-2003 
period to examine how the magnitudes of tax audit adjustments (which measure tax 
noncompliance) change as book-tax conformity decreases.1 Their study provides 
evidence that tax noncompliance increases as the book-tax conformity decreases. 
Thus, according to book-tax trade off-theory, the significant reduction in book-tax 
conformity in the post-2007 period should provide Chinese firms with even more 
flexibility to increase tax noncompliance, due to lower non-tax costs.  
Aggressive tax reporting practices can be costly to society. Policy makers have 
therefore developed various ways to reduce tax noncompliance, including cuts in tax 
rates (providing a side-effect on tax compliance) and more stringent tax enforcement 
measures. This essay aims to fill a research gap on this topic by providing evidence 
1 Chinese tax authorities consider both tax avoidance and tax evasion as noncompliance. All 
noncompliance is subject to penalty, and the tax authorities do not normally differentiate between 
avoidance and evasion. Although tax evaders can be prosecuted and jailed, the government typically 
levies monetary penalties. 
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on the comparative effects of various tax policies. To do this, I build on research by 
Chan et al. (2010) to investigate the tax noncompliance behavior of Chinese listed 
firms after they formally adopt IFRS, taking into account the effects of lower tax rates 
and stricter tax enforcement measures during a sample period from 2001 to 2012 
(which includes pre- and post-IFRS years). Previous studies have investigated how 
the factors of book-tax delinking, lower tax rates and tax enforcement each have an 
effect on tax noncompliance. However, to my knowledge, no study has assessed the 
effects of (i) the interaction between book-tax delinking and tax rate change on tax 
noncompliance, or of (ii) the interaction between book-tax delinking and stringent tax 
enforcement on tax noncompliance. Thus, this essay contributes to the literature by 
examining the comparative effects of these factors on tax noncompliance.  
Previous literature has focused on the benefits of adopting IFRS, such as 
increased financial statement comparability and capital market effects. Only a limited 
number of studies have examined the effect of IFRS adoption on tax reporting 
behavior. De Simone (2013) investigates whether the adoption of IFRS by the 
individual affiliates of multinational companies (for their unconsolidated financial 
reporting) facilitates tax-motivated profit shifting. Chan et al. (2010) examine tax 
noncompliance behavior in China from 1996 to 2003, as the nation moved from 
tax-based accounting toward IFRS. However, China had not yet comprehensively 
adopted the IFRS during this sample period, and there was no statutory reduction in 
corporate tax rates during that time.  
Recent studies have examined the effect of China’s recent tax rate reduction on 
earnings management (Lin, Lu, and Zhang 2012; Lin, Mills, and Zhang 2013). Chan, 
Leng, and Liang (2014) analyze the effect of sales tax rate reductions on the profits of 
automobile companies in China. They also provide a simulation (but not an empirical 
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test) of this effect. Many studies in various settings provide empirical evidence that 
tax rates are negatively associated with tax compliance (Feinstein 1991; Christian and 
Gupta 1993; Freire-Serén and Panadés 2013; Mas’ud, Aliyu, and Gambo 2014). 
Although reducing tax noncompliance is not the main purpose of tax rate cuts, 
noncompliance should be reduced due to the lower incentives for avoiding tax. 
China’s corporate tax rate was reduced from 33 percent to 25 percent starting January 
1, 2008. This lower rate should reduce tax noncompliance correspondingly. However, 
the extent to which lower tax rates moderate the increased tax noncompliance that 
arises from a decrease in book-tax conformity has not been explored.  
Policy makers in both developed and developing countries have made combating 
tax noncompliance one of the main aims of their tax policies. The authorities have 
therefore moved to strengthen tax enforcement as a means to improve tax compliance. 
With stronger tax enforcement, taxpayers should show increased compliance due to 
the additional surcharges and penalties. However, little empirical research has been 
done on the actual effects of tax enforcement on corporate tax avoidance. Thus far, no 
study has examined whether or to what extent stronger tax enforcement measures 
overcome the increased noncompliance that arises from a decrease in book-tax 
conformity. The government has an interest in the effects of its tax enforcement efforts, 
especially in a book-tax disconformity period. The results of my research should 
therefore be useful to regulators and policy makers in many countries, including those 
that have not yet decided to move toward IFRS. 
 Based on empirical data from Chinese listed firms during the 2001-2012 period, I 
find that a lower tax rate significantly reduces the negative effect that a decrease in 
book-tax conformity has on tax noncompliance. The use of stricter tax enforcement 
measures also attenuates the effect of a decrease in book-tax conformity on tax 
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noncompliance. The regression results also suggest that use of a lower tax rate is 
more effective than the use of a stronger tax enforcement for attenuating the effect 
that delinking has on tax noncompliance. Upon taking into account both the effect of 
a lower tax rate and a more stringent tax enforcement measures together, the resulting 
impact is then able to more than offset the negative delinking effect on tax 
noncompliance.  
 I also find that both the tax rate effect and the tax enforcement effect are able to 
constrain tax noncompliance in both the high- and the low- conformity periods. 
Moreover, the effects of these two measures increase significantly from the high- to 
the low-conformity period (i.e., both effects are more pronounced when the 
conformity is lower). These research findings are robust to various sensitivity tests. 
In the past decade, the adoption of IFRS and lower tax rates have both occurred 
at about the same time in many countries, such as China, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia 
and the European Union countries.2 Deloitte (2008) reports that the overall tax 
results under IFRS are not as favorable as those under local Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). For example, many instruments that currently qualify 
as equity under local GAAP may be re-characterized as debt after applying IFRS. 
This change in accounting standards may also trigger the interest expense limitation 
rules for tax reporting purposes, thus increasing the tax burden on firms.3 In this 
situation, A tax rate reduction policy to apply lower tax rates on firms may then be 
effective in offsetting the increased tax burden on companies and in maintaining tax 
2 For example, in June 2014, the Japanese government announced its intention to reduce the corporate 
tax rate from 36 percent to 25 percent as country pursued the adoption of IFRS (SCMP 2014). 
 
3 Another example is change in the classification of hybrid instruments, such as those in which a firm 
that receives “interest” is treated as receiving a dividend, but the interest-paying firm gets an interest 
deduction. For such instruments, a change in the definition of equity under the IFRS may 
unexpectedly eliminate the tax benefits of hybrid instruments, as the income may be treated as interest 
income (taxable) rather than a dividend (tax exempt). Such changes can increase the tax burden on 
recipient firms.  
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competitiveness. It is therefore useful for researchers and policy makers to understand 
how these factors interact to influence tax noncompliance. My research results can 
provide a useful reference for countries that are contemplating a lower corporate tax 
rate to increase their tax competitiveness, and are at the same time moving toward the 
use of IFRS-equivalent accounting standards to meet the challenge of business 
globalization. China is not alone in attempting to move away from a tax-based 
accounting system while lowering tax rates. Therefore, my research results may 
prove informative to international accounting standard setters and tax regulators 
around the world, who face the need to improve financial reporting while increasing 
tax competitiveness. 
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes China’s 
2008 tax reform and its changes in accounting standards toward the adoption of IFRS 
during 2007. Section 2.3 reviews the relevant literature and develops the research 
hypotheses. Section 2.4 presents the research method. Section 2.5 discusses the 
empirical results, and section 2.6 presents the conclusions.  
 
2.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
2.2.1 China’s 2008 Tax Reform  
To attract foreign investment, China moved in 1991 to enact different income tax 
policies for foreign investment enterprises and domestic enterprises. Domestic 
enterprises were generally taxed at a flat rate of 33 percent (including 3 percent local 
tax), and foreign investment enterprises often enjoyed a preferential tax rate of 15 
percent (with local tax waived). As China’s economy grew, efforts were made to unify 
the corporate income tax system, such that all enterprises would be taxed at the same 
rate. On March 16, 2007, the National People’s Congress promulgated a New 
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Enterprise Income Tax Law (NEIT) to take effect on January 1, 2008. This law 
unified the corporate tax rate for all enterprises at a flat rate of 25 percent (with no 
local tax imposed). Thus, for domestic enterprises, the corporate tax rate was reduced 
from 33 percent to 25 percent. There were several reasons for this reduction in tax 
rate. The new tax policy sought to (1) enhance economic development, (2) meet the 
challenge of business globalization, (3) equalize taxation among domestic and foreign 
enterprises and (4) create an internationally competitive and efficient tax system. 
Companies that were established before the promulgation of the NEIT and had 
enjoyed preferential tax treatment in the form of reduced enterprise income tax rates 
were allowed a gradual transition to the standard tax rate over a five-year period, 
beginning from 2008. More specifically, enterprises that operated in the Special 
Economic Zones or the Shanghai Pudong New Area, which were originally subject to 
a tax rate of 15 percent, were granted a favorable corporate income tax rate of 18 
percent for 2008, 20 percent for 2009, 22 percent for 2010, 24 percent for 2011 and 
25 percent for 2012. Enterprises that previously enjoyed a “two-year exemption 
followed by a three-year half-rate reduction” or a “five-year exemption followed by a 
five-year half-rate reduction” could continue to enjoy such treatment until the end of 
their preferential treatment periods.  
 
2.2.2 Change in Accounting Standards to Converge with IFRS  
Starting from the late 1990s, China gradually recognized the need to move away from 
its tax-based accounting system. Effective from 2001, the country adopted the revised 
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, which marked a departure from a 
tax-based accounting system toward the application of IFRS (Chan et al. 2010). The 
internationalization of Chinese accounting has been driven by rapid progress in 
72 
                                                                       
economic restructuring toward a market-oriented economy and by the government’s 
intention to attract more foreign capital. In particular, following China’s official entry 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 2001, the Chinese economy has 
become increasingly integrated with the world market. This development calls for the 
harmonization of Chinese accounting standards and practices with internationally 
accepted norms, because accounting serves as the language of business. 
The year 2007 was another turning point in Chinese accounting regulations. In 
February 2006, the Ministry of Finance in China promulgated a new set of 
IFRS-equivalent Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, which took effect 
from January 1, 2007. This reform served to accommodate the growing demand for 
investor-oriented financial information. The new rules outlined basic standards and a 
new conceptual framework for accounting principles, which included 38 sets of 
specific standards with application guidelines for practice.  
In addition to achieving the convergence of Chinese accounting standards with 
the IFRS, the new standards signaled another major departure of financial reporting 
from tax-based reporting, which further reduced book-tax conformity. The new 
accounting and tax regulations have allowed a widening gap between financial and 
tax reporting in the post-2007 period. Examples of this gap include the use of the fair 
value model for investment properties and the use of the tax effect method to account 
for income tax, as elaborated below. 
One of the most significant changes under the new accounting standards is the 
introduction of the fair value model in areas such as investment properties and 
financial instruments. Under the fair value model, there is no need for depreciation or 
amortization of an investment property. Therefore, a gain or loss arising from a 
change in fair value of the property should be recognized as income during the period 
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in which it arises. However, for tax purposes, investment property continues be 
accounted for using the historical costs principle (i.e., the costs of construction or the 
purchase price, plus related expenses). Any unrealized gains or losses for investment 
properties are not recognized for tax reporting purposes. Therefore, this change in 
reporting standards enables firms to inflate book income without a corresponding 
increase in taxable income. Firms may also manipulate the cost basis of their property 
to reduce taxes without a corresponding effect on financial reporting. Such delinking 
of tax and financial reporting guidelines can encourage noncompliance. 
 Another significant factor in the book-tax gap is that before 2007, most Chinese 
companies were allowed to use the tax payable method to account for income taxes 
for financial reporting purposes. Under the new Accounting Standards of 2007, firms 
are only allowed to use the tax effect method to account for income taxes. When 
using the tax payable method, a company recognizes its income tax expense based on 
the taxable income for the current period, without taking the effect of timing 
differences into account. In other words, the income tax expenses reported in 
financial statements will be the same as the income tax payable reported to the tax 
authorities for the current period. Thus, book reporting and tax reporting conform 
with respect to the income tax amount. In contrast, the tax effect method requires 
firms to recognize the effect of timing differences on income tax in the relevant 
period. Accordingly, the income tax expenses reported in the financial statements and 
the tax liabilities reported to the tax authorities can be quite different. This book-tax 
difference concerning income tax expenses provides more opportunities for firms to 
manage both book income and taxable income to their advantage.  
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2.2.3 Business Globalization 
In the absence of a global standard, each country sets its own local GAAP for 
companies that are required to publicly report their financial results. As these 
standards differ by country, it is difficult to compare companies that report in 
different jurisdictions. To meet the recent challenges of business globalization and 
accession to the WTO, many countries have been adopting or moving toward the use 
of IFRS-equivalent accounting standards, and at the same time contemplating 
corporate tax rate reductions to increase their tax competitiveness. Regulators expect 
that the use of IFRS enhances the comparability and quality of financial statements, 
and hence benefits investors (Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008; Yip and Young 2012; 
Brochet, Jagolinzer, and Riedl 2013). Starting from January 2005, the listed 
companies of all European Union countries were required to prepare consolidated 
financial statements using IFRS (Hung and Subramanyam 2007; Christensen, Hail, 
and Leuz 2013; PwC 2013). In addition to China, other transition economies such as 
Russia and Vietnam have also departed from tax-based accounting toward the 
adoption of IFRS in recent years (Goncharov and Zimmermann 2006; Phuong and 
Richard 2011).  
Corporate tax rate reduction has also emerged as an important strategic policy in 
many jurisdictions, as a means to maintain tax competitiveness. Foreign direct 
investments (FDI) and decisions regarding new plants are affected by the corporate 
tax burden. De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) compare the outcomes of 25 empirical 
studies by computing the effects of tax rate elasticity on FDI. They find that a 1 percent 
reduction in the host-country’s tax rate raises FDI in that country by 3.3 percent. 
Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) find that the fall in statutory tax rates in 
the OECD countries during the 1980s and 1990s can be explained by competition 
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between these countries’ over corporate taxes for mobile profits. Desai, Foley, and 
Hines Jr. (2004) also find that high income tax rates are associated with low levels of 
FDI.  
I observe that the adoption of IFRS and reductions in corporate tax rates often 
occur either concurrently or consecutively in many countries, especially in economies 
that are heavily dependent on international business and investment. Typical 
examples include the European Union countries and Japan.4 Along with their joint 
adoption of IFRS in 2005, some 25 out of the 27 European Union countries reduced 
their corporate income tax rates during the period from 2001 to 2012, with an average 
decrease of 27 percent (as indicated in Table 1). Among developing countries, I find 
that tax rate reductions and adoptions of IFRS have occurred at close to the same 
times in nations such as Vietnam and Indonesia.5 Deloitte (2008) finds that the 
overall tax results under IFRS are not as favorable as those under local GAAP. 
Therefore, a tax policy of adopting lower tax rates can be used to mitigate tax 
consequences. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
4 Qualifying companies in Japan have been permitted to adopt IFRS for preparing their consolidated 
financial statements on a voluntary basis since March 2010. To encourage further application of IFRS 
in October 2013, the Financial Services Agency (FSA) of Japan eliminated certain eligibility 
requirements for companies to use IFRS. At the same time, Japan decreased its corporate income tax 
rate from 40.69 percent in 2010 to 38.01 percent in 2012, and to 35.64 percent in 2014. 
 
5 During the 2001 to 2005 period, the Ministry of Finance of Vietnam gradually adopted IFRS by 
implementing a total of 26 IFRS-equivalent Vietnam Accounting Standards in five batches. The 
corporate tax rate in Vietnam was also reduced from 35 percent in 1999 to 32.5 percent in 2000, 32 
percent in 2001 and 28 percent in 2004. On December 23, 2008, the Indonesian Institute of Accounts 
(IAI) announced its plan to harmonize the Indonesian Statement of Accounting Standards with IFRS 
starting from 2009. As of December 1, 2012, the IAI had published 40 standards, 20 interpretations and 
11 revocations. Along with this accounting standard harmonization process, Indonesia’s corporate tax 
rate was decreased from the highest maximum progressive rate of 30 percent in 2008 to a flat rate of 
28 percent in 2009, and then to 25 percent in 2010.  
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2.3.1 Book-Tax Delinking and Lower Tax Rates  
In a tax-based accounting system, if firms understate their taxable incomes, they 
generally have to report lower book income. Likewise, if they overstate book income, 
they have to pay higher taxes. In other words, when the two measures of income 
conform to each other, there is less flexibility for opportunistic reporting behavior. 
The formal adoption of IFRS in 2007 has further reduced book-tax conformity in 
China. This book-tax delinking provides more opportunities for management to 
practice both upward earnings management and aggressive tax noncompliance 
(downward reporting of taxable income). In a lower book-tax conformity period, 
management has greater incentives to engage in tax noncompliance due to lower 
non-tax costs, according to book-tax trade-off theory (Mills and Newberry 2001). 
Badertscher, Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2009) and Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) 
also suggest that when tax reporting and financial reporting need not conform with 
each other, firms are able to manipulate the income measures for both sets of 
reporting requirements to achieve their optimal reporting outcomes. Furthermore, 
Chan et al. (2010) find that tax noncompliance increases as book-tax conformity 
decreases in China. De Simone (2013) investigates whether the adoption of IFRS by 
individual affiliates of multinational entities in European Union countries for 
unconsolidated financial reporting facilities tax-motivated profit shifting. She finds a 
17.5 percent tax-motivated change in reported pre-tax profits following the 
affiliates’ adoption of IFRS, as compared to no change in income shifting behavior 
among non-adopters. 
Previous studies find evidence to support the contention that a higher tax rate is 
negatively related to tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Feinstein 1991; 
Christian and Gupta 1993; Freire-Serén and Panadés 2013; Mas’ud et al. 2014). 
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Chan and Mo (2000) examine the tax noncompliance behavior of firms in various tax 
holiday periods. They find that anticipated tax rate changes affect tax noncompliance 
and that firms are more tax compliant in the tax-exemption periods. Lin et al. (2013) 
find that before the tax rate decrease in 2008, both private and public firms in China 
had a tax-motivated incentive to manage earnings downward. Management’s 
incentive to avoid taxes should have been higher prior to 2008, due to the higher tax 
rates. Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1992) suggest that tax avoidance involves 
non-tax costs, including administrative and implementation expenses. For example, 
substantial planning and coordination is required to shift taxable income across 
periods to reduce the tax burden. Firms subject to a lower tax rate should have lesser 
needs or incentives to understate taxable income in order to avoid additional costs.  
In general, a lower tax rate should encourage more tax compliance, but it may 
also lower the cost for noncompliance, because the additional taxes and penalties are 
lower if noncompliance is detected by the tax authorities. Thus, whether the 
imposition of a lower tax rate indeed encourages tax compliance is an empirical 
question to be further investigated.  
To summarize, previous studies provide evidence that tax noncompliance 
increases when book-tax conformity decreases, whereas a lower tax rate provides a 
direct and positive initiative to encourage tax compliance. I expect that the use of a 
lower tax rate can moderate the extent of the tax noncompliance associated with 
lower book-tax conformity. However, it is an open question whether the use of a 
lower tax rate completely overrides the negative effect of lower book-tax conformity 
on tax noncompliance. Thus, I formulate the first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, adoption of a lower corporate tax rate attenuates the 
negative effect of reduced book-tax conformity on tax noncompliance. 
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2.3.2 Book-Tax Delinking and Stringent Tax Enforcement 
Empirical research on the effect of tax enforcement on corporate tax avoidance is 
limited thus far. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) find that an increase in the probability 
of detection leads to larger amounts of taxable income being declared. Firms need to 
consider the costs stemming from aggressive tax avoidance strategies, including the 
fines, interest and penalties that the tax authorities can impose for noncompliance 
(Wilson 2009). Firms can also be subject to negative publicity and high litigation 
costs if their tax noncompliance is detected (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009). Therefore, 
stricter tax enforcement can constrain tax noncompliance. Desai et al. (2007) show 
that Russian firms increased their tax payments and abandoned tax havens following 
an increase in tax enforcement after the 2000 election of Vladimir Putin. Hoopes, 
Mescall, and Pittman (2012) find that stronger tax enforcement reduces the incentives 
to understate taxable income. These authors also find that closer IRS monitoring 
tends to limit corporate tax avoidance, and this limiting effect is particularly strong 
when a firm’s corporate governance is weak. These two studies provide empirical 
evidence that tax enforcement has a deterrent effect on tax avoidance. Atwood, Drake, 
and Myers (2012) investigate a sample of firms across 22 countries and find that 
firms generally practice less tax avoidance when the level of book-tax conformity is 
high and when enforcement is perceived to be strong. Gupta and Lynch (2012) find 
that expenditure on state corporate tax enforcement is positively associated with state 
corporate tax collection, which further suggests that stringent enforcement reduces 
tax noncompliance. However, the above-mentioned studies do not examine the 
effectiveness of tax enforcement in offsetting the effect of a reduction in book-tax 
conformity on tax noncompliance. My essay supplements the findings of these 
previous studies by examining whether the tax enforcement deterrent effect attenuates 
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the negative effect that reduced book-tax conformity has on tax noncompliance.  
Slemrod (2004) suggests that due to the separation of ownership and control, the 
deterrence models of tax avoidance may not apply, because firm managers may be 
risk-averse, and shareholders with diversified portfolios may be more risk neutral. 
Therefore, shareholders may still want managers to pursue aggressive tax reporting to 
enhance firm value, even under stricter tax enforcement measures. Notwithstanding 
that stronger tax enforcement is generally expected to help in reducing a firm’s 
incentives for noncompliance, firms understandably remain eager to invest in 
aggressive tax planning to reduce their taxable income, as their after-tax earnings 
benefit shareholders directly (Mills, Erickson, and Maydew 1998).  
Furthermore, for tax enforcement measures to effectively deter tax 
noncompliance, they must be known and understood. Taxpayers must perceive that 
other offenders are being sanctioned if the enforcement measures are to prove 
effective (Morris 2010). Sanders, Reckers, and Iyer (2008) suggest that countries 
should increase tax enforcement efforts, including education on taxpayer 
accountability, in anticipation of an increased tax noncompliance Thus, the 
effectiveness of China’s tax enforcement measures may not be obvious, as the effect 
varies according to a firm’s level of awareness of the mandatory and discretionary 
penalties for noncompliance (e.g. conduct high-profile prosecutions, highlight penalty 
structures, publicize tax audit rates).  
Thus, I expect the effect of tax enforcement is able to reduce, but not completely 
offset the increase in tax noncompliance associated with book-tax disconformity. It 
remains an open empirical question as to how the relative interaction between a 
reduction in book-tax conformity and more stringent tax enforcement affects tax 
noncompliance. This consideration leads me to formulate the second hypothesis as 
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follows: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the adoption of stricter tax enforcement attenuates the 
negative effect that reduced book-tax conformity has on tax 
noncompliance.  
 
2.4 RESEARCH METHOD  
2.4.1 Sample Selection  
I draw my sample from Chinese listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges from 2001 to 2012. I collect financial statement data and other 
characteristics of the sample companies from the China Infobank database, the China 
Stock Market and Accounting Research database and the annual reports of the 
respective Chinese listed firms. I hand collect information regarding the political 
appointments of the CEOs and General Managers of the sample firms from their 
annual reports. I also hand collect the details on tax enforcement from data given in 
the China Tax Audits Yearbook.6 
I begin with 18,795 firm-year observations, which include all of the listed A 
share firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2001 to 2012. I 
exclude 946 firm years for the companies that issued B shares (shares sold only to 
foreign investors).7 I exclude an additional 686 firm years with missing corporate 
information, such as details on ownership, executive shares, independent director 
6 The China Tax Audits Yearbook is published annually by the State Administration of Taxation, and 
contains detailed information on tax collection efforts, such as the number of tax inspectors, the 
number of tax audits conducted, the amounts of regional tax revenue and the amounts of surcharges or 
penalties imposed. 
7 Chinese listed firms issue “A” shares to domestic investors, and some of these firms also issue “B” 
shares to foreign investors. From 2001 to 2006, firms that exclusively issued A shares were required 
to prepare financial reports in accordance with domestic accounting standards. In contrast, A share 
firms that simultaneously issued B shares were required to provide financial reports in compliance 
with IFRS. Thus, firms that issued both kinds of shares experienced no change in the book-tax 
conformity level from 2001 to 2012. 
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ratios or political control. My final sample therefore consists of 17,163 firm year 
observations for the primary regression (Table 5).  
 
2.4.2 Specification of the Regression Model  
To examine the comparative effects on tax noncompliance after the formal adoption 
of IFRS-equivalent accounting standards (taking into account the effects of both 
lower tax rates and more stringent tax enforcement), I develop the following 
regression model, in which time and firm subscripts are suppressed for simplicity: 
 Tax Noncompliance (Diff_ETR: Differential Effective Tax Rate) =  
α0 +α1RMSE +α2Low_Rate + α3Tax_Enforcement +α4RMSE x Low_Rate  
+α5RMSExTax_Enforcement+α6DAccrual+α7Opinion+α8Ind_Dir 
+α9Dual_Role+α10Ownership+α11Exe_Shares+α12Overseas_Shares 
+α13Rights_Issue+α14ROE+α15Leverage+α16Age+α17Cosize 
+α18Political+α19Market_Index+α20Industry_dummies 
+α21Year_dummies + ε                                                      (1)         
 
 
2.4.2.1 Measures of Tax Noncompliance and Explanatory Variables  
Tax Noncompliance 
I define tax noncompliance broadly as any activity, legal or otherwise, that reduces a 
firm’s tax liability per dollar of pre-tax earnings. I use the effective tax rate (ETR), 
which is commonly accepted in the taxation literature as a proxy for the extent of tax 
noncompliance (Kerr 2013). Given the variations in applicable statutory tax rates 
within China due to various preferential tax policies, a firm may have a low ETR due 
to receiving a preferential tax rate. To ensure that a low ETR is not due to a low 
statutory tax rate (STR), I use the differential effective tax rate (Diff_ETR=STR ˗ ETR) 
as the dependent variable in my analysis. STR is the statutory tax rate applicable to a 
given firm in a given year. Data for the STR are extracted from the firms’ annual 
reports. I follow Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) to calculate ETR as “income tax 
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expense / profit before tax.” A large Diff_ETR suggests aggressive tax reporting, 
which is an indication of greater tax noncompliance.  
Reduction in Book-Tax Conformity Level 
I follow Atwood, Drake, and Myers (2010) in measuring the level of book-tax 
conformity by calculating the root mean squared error (RMSE) from a regression of 
current tax expense on pretax book income and dividends declared. RMSE represents 
the different book-tax conformity levels for each year from 2001 to 2012. A high 
RMSE indicates a lower level of book-tax conformity in a given year. The RMSE 
takes a value from 0 to 1, which represents a range between a completely high and a 
completely low conformity level. Chan et al. (2010) find that the lower the book-tax 
conformity, the higher the tax noncompliance. I expect the coefficient α1 for the 
RMSE variable to be positive in my regression model.  
Tax Rate Effect 
A corporate tax rate reduction from 33 to 25 percent took effect in China on January 1, 
2008. As mentioned earlier, some Chinese firms located in special economic zones 
continued to enjoy preferential reduced tax rates after this 2008 tax reform. These 
firms were normally entitled to a 15 percent preferential tax rate before 2008. The tax 
rates for these firms increased gradually from 15 percent before 2008 to 25 percent in 
2012. To capture the effect of this adoption of a lower tax rate in attenuating the 
delinking effect on tax noncompliance, I code the variable Low_Rate as 1 to capture 
sample firms subject to a statutory corporate tax rate of 25 percent or lower (i.e., 
including those firms that are subject to preferential transitional arrangement). 8 
Low_Rate is coded as 0 for firm years subject to a corporate tax rate higher than 25 
8 I re-run the regression model by excluding those firms that are subject to a preferential transitional 
arrangement, and the regression results (reported in Table 8) are comparable to those of the main test 
(reported in Table 5). 
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percent. The adoption of a lower tax rate should be associated with a lesser tax 
noncompliance, and I expect the coefficient α2 to be negative. 
Tax Enforcement Effect 
Firms should be more tax compliant when tax enforcement measures are stricter. I 
therefore include the variable Tax_Enforcement, which is coded as 1 for higher tax 
enforcement, to examine the deterrent effect of enforcement on tax noncompliance. 
The coefficient α3 for this variable is expected to be negative. 
The variable Tax_Enforcement represents a set of direct estimates for regional 
tax collection efforts in a given year, based on manually collected data from the 
China Tax Audits Yearbook.9 I use factor analysis (i.e., principal component analysis) 
to generate three metrics to capture the degree of tax enforcement effort for each 
sample year and province from 2001 to 2012. These three metrics are Tax_Audit, 
Qualification and Audit_Results. Tax_Audit is measured by several ratios, including 
the number of tax audits conducted over the number of tax returns filed in each 
province, the number of cases prosecuted over the number of tax returns filed, the 
number of permanent employees over the number of taxpayers and the number of tax 
inspectors over the number of taxpayers. Qualification is the percentage of inspectors 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Audit_Results represents the ratio of the dollar 
amount of tax deficiencies settled and the dollar amount of surcharges, penalties, and 
fines, respectively, over the amount of regional tax revenue; and the dollar amount of 
surcharges, penalties, and fines over the number of tax audits conducted.  
The results shown in Table 2 indicate that three factors explain 64.4 percent of 
the total variance in the original data. To maximize the variance of the squared 
9 Some recent studies use the likelihood of an IRS audit as a proxy for tax authority enforcement 
(Guedhami and Pittman 2008; Hanlon, Hoopes, and Shroff 2014). However, this single proxy may 
have an inherent problem of reliance on variation in firm size. Thus, my study uses multiple measures 
to capture the tax enforcement effort, and most of these measures are far less reliant on variation in 
firm size. Nevertheless, I do use tax audit probability as a proxy in a robustness test. 
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loadings for each of these three retained factors on all of the eight variables/ratios in 
the corresponding factor matrix, I rotate the three factors orthogonally. Then I 
determine whether there is a statistical and substantive association between each 
factor and the other variables. The final results show that Factor 1 (Tax_Audit) is 
associated with ratios 1, 3 and 4, which are all related to the propensity for tax 
authorities to conduct and enforce tax audits in a given region. Factor 2 (Qualification) 
is associated with ratio 5, which represents the tax inspectors’ level of qualification. 
Factor 3 (Audit_Results) is associated with ratios 6 and 7, which represent tax audit 
outcomes, including tax deficiency settlements, overdue payment surcharges and 
penalties or fines imposed.  
Based on the three factors generated from the factor analysis, I construct a 
composite enforcement index that equals the average ranking for the sum of the ranks 
of the three factors for each province and year. I then set the variable 
Tax_Enforcement to 1 (meaning that tax enforcement measures are extensive) if the 
value of the composite enforcement index is above the country-level median in a 
given year, and 0 otherwise (meaning that tax enforcement measures are less 
stringent). Each sample firm is assigned a tax enforcement value of 1 or 0, to 
represent whether it is subjected to a more extensive or a weaker tax enforcement 
regime.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Comparative Effect between Determinant Factors 
I include an interaction term RMSE x Low_Rate in the regression model to examine 
the interactions between the tax rate effect and the delinking effect. The coefficient α4 
measures the sensitivity of reduced book-tax conformity on tax noncompliance 
between the high tax rate and the low tax rate groups. If the use of a lower tax rate 
85 
                                                                       
mitigates the negative effect that reduced book-tax conformity has on tax 
noncompliance, then the coefficient α4 of this interaction term should be negative 
(and therefore provide support for Hypothesis 1).  
Similarly, to examine whether the adoption of more stringent tax enforcement 
attenuates the effect that reduced book-tax conformity has on tax noncompliance, I 
include the interaction term RMSExTax_Enforcement in the regression model. If the 
use of more stringent tax enforcement mitigates the negative effect that reduced 
book-tax conformity has on tax noncompliance, then the coefficient α5 of this 
interaction term should be negative (and therefore provide support for Hypothesis 
H2).  
 
2.4.2.2 Measures of Control Variables  
In addition to the main test variables mentioned above, I include 14 mainly 
firm-characteristic variables in the regression model to control for the effects of these 
variables on a company’s tax noncompliance behavior. The variable of discretionary 
accruals (DAccrual) is used to control for the influence that a firm’s earnings 
management activities have on tax noncompliance. I calculate DAccrual according to 
the modified Jones model (1991). In China, all listed companies are required to 
submit audited financial statements together with their tax returns to the tax 
authorities. Financial reports with qualified audit opinions indicate that there are 
problems affecting the fair presentation of their operating results and financial 
positions. The tax authorities use audited book income as a benchmark for the 
measurement of taxable income in determining whether companies are 
under-reporting their income. Therefore, receiving a qualified audit opinion can 
trigger suspicion by the tax authorities (Hanlon 2003; Graham, Raedy, and 
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Shackelford 2012). Thus, I expect that companies with unqualified audit opinions 
have lesser tax noncompliance than companies with qualified audit opinions. 
Following previous empirical studies (DeFond, Wong, and Li 2000; Chan, Lin, and 
Mo 2006), I classify audit opinions (Opinion) as “qualified” if they are unqualified 
with an explanatory paragraph, qualified, contain a disclaimer or are adverse 
As the board of directors is an internal monitoring mechanism to protect the 
interests of shareholders, the composition of the board influences the effectiveness of 
internal governance. Lo, Wong, and Firth (2010) find that firms with boards having a 
high percentage of independent directors have smaller magnitudes of manipulated 
transfer prices (which indicate a strategy to manipulate tax liabilities). Also, firms that 
have different persons serving as the CEO and the chairman of the board are less 
likely to manage earnings through transfer pricing manipulations. Following Lo et al. 
(2010), I include (1) percentage of independent directors (Ind_Dir) and (2) directors 
serving a dual role (Dual_Role) as corporate governance control variables for the 
regression on tax noncompliance. 
I also include firm ownership (Ownership) as one of the control variables. I 
classify firms into SOEs and non-SOEs to control for the effect of corporate 
ownership toward tax noncompliance, as these two categories of firms have different 
economic and political motives toward generating tax revenue for the government. 
Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2004) find that executives motivated by 
stock-based compensation schemes may be willing to pay taxes on overstated 
earnings to reduce the likelihood that their earnings manipulations can be detected. 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find that increases in incentive compensation for 
executives tend to reduce the levels of tax sheltering. However, it is also possible that 
executives with a large percentage of shares may want to minimize tax payments as a 
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means to maximize after-tax dividend payouts. Chinese companies, however, seldom 
offer stock-based compensation to company executives. I thus use the percentage of 
shares held by executives (Exe_Shares) to capture the possible influence of executive 
compensation on tax noncompliance. 
Companies with shares listed on overseas stock exchanges normally have 
overseas operations. These firms are less likely to be tax compliant, due to greater 
opportunities to design tax schemes among different affiliated companies. However, 
these firms are also subject to stricter regulations in other markets, and thus may be 
more tax compliant. I use the variable Overseas_Shares to control for this possible 
effect. Also, as Chinese firms need to meet certain performance standards before they 
can issue additional shares, rights-offering firms may be motivated to manipulate 
earnings to meet those regulatory requirements. However, these firms are also under 
close scrutiny by regulators in China. I use the variable Rights_Issue to control for 
this effect.  
I include return on equity (ROE) to control for the effect of profitability on tax 
noncompliance. Companies with a low ROE are more likely to be susceptible to cash 
constraints over time, and may thus be less tax compliant. I include Leverage (total 
debts divided by total assets) to control for the effect of a company’s borrowings on 
tax noncompliance. Highly leveraged firms may have a greater need to inflate book 
income to meet debt covenant requirements. However, Graham and Tucker (2006) 
and Lisowsky (2010) find that tax shelter firms have a lower leverage than their 
counterparts. Older firms are also more likely to become susceptible to cash 
constraints after going public, and are often less compliant with tax regulations 
(Murray 1995; Chen, Chen, and Su 2001). However, older firms may have built up 
their reputations over time, and may therefore be more tax compliant to protect their 
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reputations. I include the continuous variable Age (a firm’s number of years in 
operation since its initial public offering) to control for this effect.  
Large firms may be better able to devise and execute aggressive tax strategies. 
Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007) find that company size is positively associated 
with the level of tax noncompliance. Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) find that 
long-run corporate tax avoidance is positively associated with company size. 
However, Mills (1998) fails to find such a relationship. Furthermore, political cost 
theory argues that large firms should be more tax compliant due to the greater public 
scrutiny they face (Zimmerman 1983). I include the variable Cosize to control for the 
effect of company size.  
I include the variable Political, which equals 1 if the CEO and the General 
Manager of a firm have political appointments, to control for the effect of a firm’s 
ability to negotiate with government regulators. I expect Political to be negatively 
associated with tax noncompliance. 
I include the variable Market_Index to reflect the different levels of market 
development in various provinces of China (Fan and Wang 2001 to 2011). The higher 
the index, the more developed the market. In a well-developed market, the business 
and legal environments are more complicated. Listed companies in these markets may 
have more opportunities for tax noncompliance, or they may have stricter regulations 
to follow.  
Finally, I incorporate a set of dummy variables for different industries 
(Industry_Dummies) to control for industry effects on tax noncompliance. Year 
dummies (Year_Dummies) are also included in the regression model. All of the 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
[Insert Appendix 1 about here] 
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2.5  EMIPIRICAL RESULTS  
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3 compares the descriptive statistics, the univariate tests on the tax 
noncompliance measures and the corporate-related characteristics of sample firms 
that are subject to lower STRs (25 percent or less) vs. higher STRs (greater than 25 
percent) in a given year. Firms with lower statutory tax rates are generally more tax 
compliant, receive more unqualified audit opinions, have a higher percentage of 
independent directors, are more likely to combine the chairman and CEO positions, 
are more likely to be non-SOEs, have a higher percentage of executive-owned shares, 
have more overseas shares listings and have more rights offerings. These firms also 
tend to be older and larger, to operate in a more developed market, have a lower 
book-tax conformity level and operate under a less stringent tax enforcement regime. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 compares the descriptive statistics and univariate tests on the tax 
noncompliance measures, and on the corporate-related characteristics of firms subject 
to lower vs. higher tax enforcement measures in different provinces for each year. 
Firms subject to greater tax enforcement monitoring are more tax complaint, receive 
more qualified audit opinions, have a lower percentage of independent directors, are 
less likely to allow a single person to serve as both CEO and board chairman, are 
more likely to be SOEs, have lower percentages of executive-owned shares and have 
fewer overseas share listings. Firms subject to greater tax enforcement also have more 
rights offerings, lower ROE and higher leverage ratios. These firms tend to be older 
and smaller, and are subject to greater political influence. They commonly operate in 
less developed markets, with higher tax rates and higher book-tax conformity.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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As shown in Appendix 2, all of the correlation coefficients among the variables 
are below 0.46. The average variance inflation factor for variables in the main 
regression (i.e., Table 5, column 2) is 1.25. Therefore, multicollinearity does not seem 
to be a problem in our multivariate regression analysis. 
[Insert Appendix 2 about here] 
 
2.5.2  Multivariate Tests  
Table 5 presents the regression results for the tax noncompliance model, based on the 
17,163 firm-year observations. Columns 1 and 2 present the results without and with 
the two interaction terms of RMSExLow_Rate and RMSExTax_Enforcement.  
Chan et al. (2010) find that tax noncompliance increases as book-tax conformity 
decreases. Appendix 3 (Panel A) presents the time-series of RMSE to show its 
increasing trend (i.e., the book-tax conformity decreases) from 2001 to 2012. I run an 
analysis to regress the RMSE on the Year variable, and the regression results shown in 
Panel B support the overall increasing trend of RMSE over the years. The t-test results 
shown in Panel C indicate that the mean value of RMSE increases from 0.0102 in the 
pre-2007 period (2001-2006) up to 0.0132 in the post-2007 period (2007-2012), 
which indicates that there is a significant decrease in book-tax conformity across 
these two periods (with a significant t-test rejecting the null hypothesis of equal 
means at the 1 percent level). A reduction in book-tax conformity should motivate 
firms to engage in tax noncompliance behavior. I find that the coefficient of RMSE is 
significantly positive in both columns 1 and 2 of Table 5. This result provides 
evidence that the lower the book-tax conformity, the higher the tax noncompliance. 
On average, the increase in the differential ETR is around 1.04 percent from the high 
to the low book-tax conformity level on average.  
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The coefficient of Low_Rate is significantly negative in both columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 5, which indicates that firms subject to lower corporate tax rates (equal to or 
less than 25 percent) are more tax compliant than their counterparts. The differential 
ETR drops by 11.3 percent when the tax rates become lower. The average mean tax 
rate for the high tax rate group and the low tax rate groups are 33 percent and 18 
percent, respectively (i.e., a difference of 15 percent). There is, on average, about a 
0.75 percent decrease in the differential ETR when the STR is reduced by 1 percent 
(which equals 11.3 percent divided by 15 percent). 
The coefficient on Tax_Enforcement is also significantly negative in both 
columns, which supports the contention that the stricter tax enforcement measures 
conducted by Chinese tax authorities are effective deterrents. On average, the 
differential ETR is reduced by about 0.3 percent when the tax enforcement measures 
become more stringent.  
As shown in column 2 of Table 5, the coefficient of RMSE is significantly 
positive, which indicates that when book-tax conformity changes from a high to a low 
level, the tax noncompliance increases significantly in the high tax rate group 
(book-tax delinking effect). The coefficient of the interaction term RMSE x Low_Rate 
is negative, indicating that the delinking effect performs differently between the high 
and the low tax rate groups. In other words, the effect that book-tax delinking has on 
tax noncompliance is lower for the low tax rate group than for the high tax rate group. 
This result provides evidence to support Hypothesis H1 that the negative effect of 
book-tax delinking on tax noncompliance is significantly attenuated by the adoption 
of lower tax rates. The negative effect that book-tax disconformity has on tax 
noncompliance is reduced by around 0.75 percent when the STR is reduced by 1 
percent. This figure, on average, equals 11.211 (which is the coefficient of the 
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interaction term RMSExLow_Rate) divided by 15 (which is the difference between 
the mean tax rate for the high tax rate group and for the low tax rate group) per 
firm-year. As indicated in Appendix 4, the economic significance of using a high tax 
rate (higher than 25 percent) versus a low tax rate (25 percent or lower) to reduce 
under-reporting of tax liabilities is around RMB 89.9 million. This figure represents 
an average reduction of under-reported tax liabilities totaling around RMB 5.99 
million per firm-year (which is 89.9 divided by 15) when the tax rate is reduced by 1 
percent.10 The use of a lower tax rate improves tax compliance, but has its own costs 
in terms of lowering tax revenue. This cost is around RMB 8.02 million per firm-year 
on average (which is estimated based on average profits before tax, as the taxable 
income data are unavailable) if the government reduces the STR by 1 percent.  
Based on the above estimates, the benefits from adopting a lower tax rate to mitigate 
the negative effect of book-tax disconformity are able to cover around 75 percent of 
the costs (i.e., RMB 5.99 million divided by RMB 8.02 million). 
The sum of the two variable coefficients (RMSE + RMSExLow_Rate) is not 
significant (-0.006 in column 2), which suggests that there is no significant book-tax 
delinking effect on tax noncompliance for the low tax rate group. That is, the 
reduction in book-tax conformity level has no significant effect on tax noncompliance 
when a lower tax rate is adopted. However, the coefficient of this summated variable 
is not significantly negative, which suggests that the adoption of a lower tax rate does 
not more than offset, but can only significantly reduce the negative book-tax 
delinking effect on tax noncompliance.  
However, the coefficient of the interaction term RMSExTax_Enforcement is 
significantly negative. This result indicates that the delinking effect performs 
10 The average profits before tax during the sample years is RMB 802 million per firm-year. 
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differently between the low and the high tax enforcement groups. The result supports 
Hypothesis H2 that the adoption of a more stringent tax enforcement policy can 
moderate the negative effect that book-tax delinking has on tax noncompliance.  
The sum of two variable coefficients (RMSE + RMSExTax_Enforcement) 
represents the effect that a reduction in the conformity level has on tax 
noncompliance in the high tax enforcement group. However, this coefficient is 
significantly positive, which indicates that the adoption of more stringent tax 
enforcement measures is able to reduce, but not to override, the effect of book-tax 
delinking on tax noncompliance (i.e., there is a net increase in tax noncompliance at 
the lower book-tax conformity level). The negative effect of book-tax disconformity 
on tax noncompliance is slightly reduced (by around 0.01 percent per firm-year on 
average) when tax enforcement becomes more stringent. The economic significance 
of using more stringent tax enforcement to reduce under-reported tax liabilities is 
around RMB 0.1 million. 
In addition, I find that the difference between the respective coefficients of the 
two interaction terms (i.e., coefficient of RMSExLow_Rate minus the coefficient of 
RMSExTax_Enforcement, which equals -11.20) is significantly negative at the 1 
percent level. This result suggests that the use of lower tax rates is more effective than 
the use of more stringent tax enforcement to attenuate the negative effect of book-tax 
delinking on tax noncompliance. As the tax authorities are constrained by limited 
resources, and it is costly to audit a large proportion of firms, the Chinese 
government may rely on the use of lower tax rates to increase tax compliance.  
Regarding the control variables, the regression results in Table 5 show that firms 
with more unqualified audit opinions (Opinion), that are SOEs (Ownership), have 
more rights offerings (Rights_Issue) and are younger (Age) are significantly less tax 
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noncompliant than their counterparts. However, firms with more overseas listings 
(Overseas_Shares), that have higher leverage (Leverage) and that operate in a better 
developed market (Market_Index) are more tax noncompliant than their counterparts. 
These results are in line with our expectations.11 
[Insert Table 5, Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 about here] 
 
2.5.3 Robustness Tests 
I conduct various sensitivity tests to examine the robustness of my primary research 
results. 
 
2.5.3.1 Alternative Measures of Tax Noncompliance  
I re-run the regression model by using alternative measures of Diff_ETR in which 
ETR has the following three definitions: (1) ETR1 = [income tax expenses / (profits 
before tax + asset impairment loss ˗ investment income)]; (2) ETR2 = [(income tax 
expense ˗ deferred income tax expense) / (profit before tax + asset impairment loss ˗ 
investment income)] and (3) ETR3 = [(income tax expense ˗ deferred income tax 
expense) / income from operation].12 Deferred tax expense represents taxes to be 
paid in the future when book-tax differences are reversed. The regression results 
under these various definitions of Diff-ETR are reported in Table 6, and they are 
11 I exclude 838 firm-year observations with negative tax expenses or negative taxable income, and 
re-run the regression model (1). The re-run regression results are consistent with the main test results 
shown in Table 5, i.e., there is no change in the expected direction or significance of the test variables.  
12 For ETR1, I take the special characteristics of China’s income tax policies into account when 
calculating the denominator of adjusted profits before tax. This figure is calculated as profit before tax 
+ asset impairment loss ˗ investment returns (Wang 2003; Wu, Rui, and Wu 2013). Asset impairment 
loss is added back, because this factor cannot be deducted from taxable income when investment income 
is subtracted, because investment income is not taxable. For ETR2, I use only the current portion of a 
firm’s tax expense for the ETR numerator, and I exclude the deferred tax portion (following the same 
approach adopted by Gupta and Newberry (1997), Zeng (2011) and Wu et al. (2013)). For ETR3, I 
follow Wu et al. (2003) and Adhikari, Derashid, and Zhang (2006) in substituting cash flow from 
operations for adjusted profit before tax. This method eliminates the effects that different accounting 
treatments have on income.  
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largely similar to the main regression results shown in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
2.5.3.2Alternative Measures of Lower Tax Rates, Stricter Tax Enforcement and 
Reduction in Book-Tax Conformity 
I re-run the regression model by varying the measures for the major explanatory 
variables. I use different cut-off points for the tax rate to replicate the main test results 
using regression model (1). First, I code the variable Low_Rate as 1 to include sample 
firms that are subject to corporate tax rates lower than 33 percent in a given year. 
Low_Rate is coded as 0 for firm years subject to a corporate tax rate equal to 33 
percent in a given year, which is the maximum corporate tax rate during the sample 
period. The regression results are reported in Table 7, column 1, and they are largely 
similar to those of the main regression results given in Table 5.  
Second, I further re-define the variable Low_Rate as 1 for firms subject to 
corporate tax rates of 15 percent or lower (which are the preferential tax rates 
applicable during the sample period, as mentioned earlier). The variable of Low_Rate 
is coded as 0 for firm years subject to corporate tax rates higher than 15 percent. 
Table 7, column 2, shows that the coefficient on RMSE + RMSExLow_Rate is 
significantly negative, which indicates that the tax rate effect can more than offset the 
negative effect of the reduction in book-tax conformity. 
Third, I code the variable of Low_Rate as 1 to include sample firms subject to a 
corporate tax rate equal to 25 percent in a given year (i.e., excluding firms that 
enjoyed preferential reduced tax rates of lower than 25 percent during the sample 
years). Low_Rate is coded as 0 for firm years subject to a corporate tax rate equal to 
33 percent in a given year, which is the maximum corporate tax rate during the 
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sample period. The regression results are reported in Table 8, and they support both 
Hypotheses H1 and H2. That is, the adoption of either a lower tax rate or a stricter tax 
enforcement regime is able to attenuate the negative effect that reduced book-tax 
conformity has on tax noncompliance. The coefficient on RMSE + RMSExLow_Rate 
is significantly negative, which indicates that the tax rate effect more than offsets the 
negative effect of book-tax disconformity. 
[Insert Table 7 and Table 8 about here] 
Fourth, I use the probability of a tax audit in each province to proxy for the level 
of tax enforcement. For each year, the tax audit probability is calculated by the 
number of firms being tax audited over the total number of tax returns filed in a 
province. Tax_Enforcement equals 1 if the probability of being audited is above the 
country-level median, and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in Table 9, and they 
indicate that stringent tax enforcement can reduce some, but cannot override the 
negative effect of book-tax delinking on tax noncompliance. These findings are 
consistent with those of the main test results shown in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Finally, I use an alternative measure for the variable RMSE to capture the effect 
of the decrease in book-tax conformity level. I re-define the variable RMSE by using 
a binary number measure to re-run the regression model. As mentioned before, RMSE 
is the root mean squared error from a regression of current tax expense on pretax 
book income and dividends declared. RMSE represents the book-tax conformity level 
in China for a given year during the period from 2001 to 2012. Here, I use a binary 
value for RMSE, with 1 indicating RMSE above the median, and 0 below the median. 
Table 10 shows that the coefficient on RMSE + RMSExLow_Rate is significantly 
negative, which indicates that the tax rate effect more than offsets the negative effect 
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of book-tax disconformity. However, the coefficient of RMSE + 
RMSExTax_Enforcement is significantly positive. This result is similar to the main 
test results, and confirms that stringent tax enforcement is able to reduce some, but 
not to override, the effect of book-tax delinking on tax noncompliance.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
2.5.4 Tax Rate Effect and Tax Enforcement Effect at Different Book-Tax 
Conformity Levels 
To further examine whether the tax rate effect and the tax enforcement effect perform 
differently at different book-tax conformity levels, I continue to adopt the binary 
measure of RMSE to proxy for the book-tax conformity level during the sample 
period. The variable RMSE is assigned a value of 1 if a sample firm year’s RMSE 
value is above median, and 0 if it is below median.  
As reported in Table 10, the coefficients of Low_Rate and Tax_Enforcement are 
both significantly negative (-8.905 and -0.237, respectively). This result indicates that 
lower tax rates (and stricter tax enforcement) are able to reduce tax noncompliance at 
the high book-tax conformity level. The two respective sums of the variable 
coefficients (i.e., Low_Rate + RMSExLow_Rate = -17.060 for the tax rate effect, and 
Tax_Enforcement + RMSExTax_Enforcement = -0.252 for the tax enforcement effect) 
are both significantly negative, which suggests that a lower tax rate (and stricter tax 
rate enforcement) is also able to constrain tax noncompliance at the lower book-tax 
conformity level.  
The respective coefficients of the two interaction terms RMSExLow_Rate (for 
the tax rate effect) and RMSExTax_Enforcement (for the tax enforcement effect) are 
both significantly negative, which suggests that the tax rate effect (and the tax 
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enforcement effect) performs differently at different conformity levels. In particular, 
the tax rate effect is more pronounced in constraining tax noncompliance at the lower 
book-tax conformity level. The effectiveness of stricter tax enforcement is also 
statistically larger at the lower conformity level. 
 
2.5.5 The Influence of Adopting both Lower Tax Rates and More Stringent Tax 
Enforcement on the Delinking Effect  
To further examine whether the effect of book-tax delinking on tax noncompliance 
performs differently when taking into account BOTH the use of lower tax rates and 
more stringent enforcement, I include an interaction term combining three variables 
(RMSExLow_RatexTax_Enforcement) in the following regression model 2.  
Tax Noncompliance (Diff_ETR: Differential Effective Tax Rate) =  
  α0 +α1RMSE +α2Low_Rate + α3Tax_Enforcement +α4RMSE x Low_Rate  
  +α5RMSE x Tax_Enforcement + α6RMSE x Low_Rate x Tax_Enforcement 
 + α7DAccrual + α8Opinion + α9Ind_Dir +α10Dual_Role+α11Ownership 
 +α12Exe_Shares+α13Overseas_Shares+α14Rights_Issue+α15ROE 
 +α16Leverage+α17Age+α18Cosize+α19Political+α20Market_Index 
 +α21Industry_dummies +α22Year_dummies + ε                  (2) 
  
 As indicated in Table 11, the significant positive coefficient of RMSE suggests 
that a reduction in book-tax conformity is associated with significantly high tax 
noncompliance in the group with high tax rates and low tax enforcement. The sum of 
the coefficients of RMSE and the respective interaction terms (including RMSE, 
RMSExLow_Rate, RMSExTax_Enforcement and RMSExLow_RatexTax_Enforcement) 
represents the book-tax delinking effect on noncompliance in the group with lower 
tax rates and higher tax enforcement. The coefficient is significantly negative 
(-0.347), indicating that upon using both a “lower tax rate” and “higher tax 
enforcement” together, the effect more than offsets the negative effect of delinking on 
tax noncompliance. The sum of the coefficients for these three interaction terms (i.e., 
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RMSExLow_Rate, RMSExTax_Enforcement and RMSExLow_RatexTax_Enforcement) 
is significantly negative, which indicates that the effect of reduction in conformity 
level on tax noncompliance is significantly reduced (and more than offset) when 
using both lower tax rates and more effective enforcement.13  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS  
This essay examines how a reduction in the book-tax conformity level interacts with 
the adoption of lower corporate tax rates and stricter tax enforcement to affect firms’ 
tax noncompliance behavior. To my knowledge, this essay is the first to examine the 
interactions among these important factors affecting tax noncompliance. I find that 
the adoption of a lower tax rate reduces the negative effect that a reduction in 
book-tax conformity has on a firm’s tax noncompliance. Stricter tax scrutiny also 
provides a deterrent effect on tax noncompliance. On applying both lower tax rates 
and more stringent tax enforcement, the resulting effect is more than offset the 
negative effect that delinking has on tax noncompliance. If either one of these two 
mitigating factors is applied individually, neither the use of a lower tax rate nor 
stringent tax enforcement can completely overcome the negative effect of book-tax 
disconformity on tax noncompliance.  
For fiscal, social or economic reasons, tax authorities around the world are trying 
their best to identify cost-effective ways of reducing tax noncompliance. My research 
results shed light on the relative importance of various determinants of tax 
noncompliance. My essay is the first to analyze the comparative effects that a 
13 I exclude 838 firm-year observations with negative tax expenses or negative taxable income to 
re-run the regression model (2). The results of this re-run regression are consistent with the results 
reported in Table 11, i.e., there is no change in the expected direction or significance of the test 
variables. 
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departure from tax-based accounting can have on tax noncompliance, taking into 
account the influence of lower tax rates and strengthened tax enforcement measures. 
The move to IFRS reporting is an international trend. Both the move toward IFRS 
and the cuts to tax rates are necessary policies for many countries if they hope to 
compete in the international market. Also, governments have an interest in ensuring 
the effectiveness of their tax scrutiny efforts, especially in the new IFRS reporting 
environment. Governments need to evaluate whether it is necessary to strengthen tax 
enforcement to reduce firms’ incentives to engage in tax noncompliance. Hence, my 
research findings should be of substantial interest to regulators and policy makers in 
many countries, including those that have not yet decided to move toward IFRS. This 
essay provides evidence that the combined use of lower tax rates and stringent tax 
enforcement policies is an effective way to mitigate tax noncompliance in countries 
that are departing from tax-based accounting and moving toward the adoption of 
IFRS. The use of reduced tax rates has a more significant effect than tax enforcement, 
because lower tax rates reduce a firm’s tax burden and benefit shareholders directly. 
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TABLE 1 
Statutory Corporate Tax Rates (Percent) of European Union Countries  
from 2001 to 2012 
 
 
Country/ 
Tax Rate 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% change 
of tax rate  
2001-2012 
1. Austria 34 34 34 34 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 -26 
2. Belgium 40 40 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 -15 
3. Bulgaria 28 24 24 20 15 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 -64 
4. Cyprus 28 28 15 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 -64 
5. Czech 
Republic 31 31 31 28 26 24 24 21 20 
 
19 
 
19 
 
19 
 
-39 
6. Denmark 30 30 30 30 28 28 25 25 25 25 25 25 -17 
7. Estonia 26 26 26 26 24 23 22 21 21 21 21 21 -19 
8. Finland 29 29 29 29 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 25 -16 
9. France 35 34 34 34 34 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 -6 
10. Germany 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 30 30 30 30 30 -23 
11. Greece 38 35 35 35 32 29 25 25 25 24 20 20 -47 
12. Hungary 18 18 18 16 16 16 16 16 16 19 19 19 +6 
13. Ireland 20 16 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 -38 
14. Italy 40 40 38 37 37 37 37 31 31 31 31 31 -22 
15. Latvia 29 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 -48 
16. Lithuania 24 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20 15 15 15 -38 
17. Luxembourg 38 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 29 29 29 29 -23 
18. Malta 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 0 
19. Netherlands 35 35 35 35 32 30 26 26 26 26 25 25 -29 
20. Poland 28 28 27 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 -32 
21. Portugal 35 33 33 28 28 28 25 25 25 25 25 25 -29 
22. Slovak 
Republic 29 25 25 19 19 19 19 19 19 
 
19 
 
19 
 
19 
 
-34 
23. Romania 43 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 20 20 20 20 -53 
24. Slovenia 25 25 25 25 25 25 23 22 21 20 20 18 -28 
25. Spain 35 35 35 35 35 35 32.5 30 30 30 30 30 -14 
26. Sweden 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 26 26 26 26 -6 
27. United 
Kingdom 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 28 
 
28 
 
26 
 
24 
 
-20 
         
       No. of countries with tax rate reduction: 25 
       Average decrease of tax rate (percent): -27 
       Standard derivation: 17.96 
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 TABLE 2 Factor Loading Matrix for Tax Enforcement Measures  
   
 
 Factor Loading Matrix  Rotated Factor Loading 
   
Factor Loading Coefficients 
 Ratio Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3   Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3   Uniqueness Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
 Ratio 1 0.680 0.325 -0.059  0.618 0.299 -0.316  0.429 
 
0.197 0.227 -0.187 
 Ratio 2 0.331 -0.734 -0.125  0.358 -0.732 0.027  0.336 
 
0.136 -0.583 0.034 
 Ratio 3 0.811 -0.091 0.220  0.845 -0.007 0.035  0.285 
 
0.331 0.003 0.150 
 Ratio 4 0.907 -0.086 -0.015  0.884 -0.075 -0.206  0.170 
 
0.312 -0.065 -0.070 
 Ratio 5 -0.345 -0.063 0.799  -0.150 0.187 0.839  0.239 
 
0.061 0.195 0.760 
 Ratio 6 0.394 0.500 0.434  0.436 0.616 0.155  0.406 
 
0.195 0.506 0.238 
 Ratio 7 0.136 0.576 -0.353  0.003 0.437 -0.532  0.526 
 
-0.070 0.321 -0.464 
 Ratio 8 -0.707 0.174 -0.098  -0.724 0.125 0.027  0.460 
 
-0.275 0.096 -0.070 
 Eigenvalue 2.846 1.275 1.029  
          % of Variance 35.573 15.939 12.862  
          Cumulative % 35.573 51.512 64.374   
 
     
Ratio 1  =  The number of tax audits conducted over the number of tax returns filed. 
 Ratio 2  =  The number of cases prosecuted over the number of tax returns filed. 
 Ratio 3  =  The number of permanent employees over the number of taxpayers. 
 Ratio 4  =  The number of tax inspectors over the number of taxpayers. 
 Ratio 5  =  The percentage of inspectors with a bachelor’s degree or higher. 
 Ratio 6  =  The dollar amount of tax deficiencies settled over the amount of regional tax revenue. 
 Ratio 7  =  The dollar amount of surcharges, penalties and fines over the amount of regional tax revenue. 
 Ratio 8  =  The dollar amount of surcharges, penalties and fines over the number of tax audits conducted. 
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TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics on the Sample Firms’ Characteristics – by Tax Rate 
(Low_Rate is coded as 1 if the statutory tax rate is 25 percent or lower, and 0 otherwise) 
N=17,163 Low_Rate=0 Low_Rate=1    
 (n=3,932) (n=13,231) t-statistic p-value  
 Mean Mean    
 (Standard deviation) (Standard deviation)    
Diff_ETR 8.8551 2.6082 31.8767 0.000 *** 
 
(12.9097) (10.0736) 
   
RMSE 0.0082 0.0101 -3.811 0.000 *** 
 (0.0029) (0.0048)    
Tax_Enforcement 0.4224 0.3728 5.6185 0.000 *** 
 (0.4940) (0.4835)    
DAccrual 0.0023 0.0000 1.3603 0.174  
 (0.0911) (0.0898)    
Opinion 0.9036 0.9344 -6.5374 0.000 *** 
 (0.2952) (0.2476)    
Ind_Dir 0.3211 0.3361 -8.5242 0.000 *** 
 (0.0844) (0.1001)    
Dual_Role 0.1272 0.1843 -8.3630 0.000 *** 
 (0.3332) (0.3877)    
Ownership 0.5287 0.1904 44.4123 0.000 *** 
 (0.4992) (0.3926)    
Exe_Shares 1.4168 6.7333 -19.1517 0.000 *** 
 (7.1614) (16.9634)    
Overseas_Shares 0.0237 0.0337 -3.1754 0.001 ** 
 (0.1520) (0.1805)    
Rights_Issue 0.0458 0.0720 -5.8256 0.000 *** 
 (0.2090) (0.2585)    
ROE 0.0581 0.0397 0.4230 0.672  
 (2.1390) (2.4660)    
Leverage 0.5699 0.5438 0.7174 0.473  
 (0.6382) (2.2527)    
Age 6.7900 8.0115 -13.7861 0.000 *** 
 (3.5246) (5.2128)    
Cosize 21.1858 21.5178 -14.9096 0.000 *** 
 (1.0893) (1.2639)    
Political 0.3327 0.3438 -1.2957 0.195  
 (0.4712) (0.4750)    
Market_Index 7.3142 8.2909 -24.2748 0.000 *** 
 (1.8183) (2.3199)    
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics on the Sample Firms’ Characteristics  
– by Tax Enforcement Level  
 
 
Low Tax  
Enforcement Group 
High Tax  
Enforcement Group    
 
(n=10,569) (n=6,594) t-statistic p-value 
 
 
Mean Mean 
   
 
(Standard deviation) (Standard deviation) 
   
Diff_ETR 4.5669 3.7103 4.9196 0.000 *** 
 (11.735) (10.6785)    
RMSE 0.0098 0.0095 3.7112 0.000 *** 
 (0.0044) (0.0047)    
Low_Rate 0.7851 0.7481 5.6185 0.000 *** 
 (0.4108) (0.4341)    
DAccrual 0.0015 0.0010 1.7826  0.175   
 (0.0900) (0.0902)    
Opinion 0.9346 0.9157 4.6521  0.000  *** 
 (0.2472) (0.2779)    
Ind_Dir 0.3382 0.3238 9.5104  0.000  *** 
 (0.0914) (0.1046)    
Dual_Role 0.1906 0.1401 8.5491  0.000  *** 
 (0.3928) (0.3471)    
Ownership 0.2291 0.3301 -14.6341  0.000  *** 
 (0.4203) (0.4703)    
Exe_Shares 7.0075 3.1235 16.1448  0.000  *** 
 (16.7086) (12.8149)    
Overseas_Shares 0.0362 0.0237 4.5989  0.000  *** 
 (0.1869) (0.1520)    
Rights_Issue 0.0627 0.0713 -2.1934  0.028  ** 
 (0.2425) (0.2573)    
ROE 0.0781 -0.0107 2.3634  0.018  ** 
 (1.4271) (3.4150)    
Leverage 0.5197 0.5981 -2.4953  0.013  ** 
 (1.4603) (2.6465)    
Age 7.5058 8.0936 -7.6502  0.000  *** 
 (5.0293) (4.6759)    
Cosize 21.4842 21.3737 5.7071  0.000  *** 
 (1.2528) (1.2001)    
Political 0.3300 0.3593 -3.9319  0.000  *** 
 (0.4702) (0.4798)    
Market_Index 8.8546 6.8049 64.6552  0.000  *** 
    (2.0812)    (1.9182)    
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 5 
Comparative Effects among Lower Tax Rates, Stricter Tax Enforcement and Reduction 
in Book-Tax Conformity on Tax Noncompliance  
 
  (1) (2) 
 
N=17,163 
Expected 
Sign 
Diff_ETR 
Coeff/[t-value] 
Diff_ETR 
Coeff/[t-value] 
Constant ? 21.376*** 12.617*** 
  [15.27] [10.70] 
RMSE + 1.043*** 11.205*** 
  [8.63] [7.03] 
Low_Rate - -11.284*** -6.118*** 
  [-11.13] [-5.40] 
Tax_Enforcement - -0.262** -0.310*** 
  [-2.56] [-3.67] 
RMSExLow_Rate -  -11.211*** 
   [-9.29] 
RMSExTax_Enforcement -  -0.011*** 
   [-3.21] 
DAccrual ? 0.696 0.617 
  [1.40] [1.47] 
Opinion - -0.828*** -0.837*** 
  [-4.58] [-5.40] 
Ind_Dir - 0.086 1.738 
  [0.03] [0.85] 
Dual_Role + -0.148 -0.026 
  [-1.24] [-0.26] 
Ownership - -1.739*** -0.726*** 
  [-5.51] [-7.96] 
Exe_Shares ? -0.014*** 0.001 
  [-4.49] [0.39] 
Overseas_Shares + 2.058*** 1.107*** 
  [7.75] [4.88] 
Rights_Issue - -0.718*** -0.560*** 
  [-3.68] [-3.58] 
ROE - 0.005 -0.015 
  [0.34] [-1.28] 
Leverage ? 0.053*** 0.051*** 
  [2.73] [3.50] 
Age ? 0.190*** 0.040*** 
  [5.53] [3.64] 
Cosize ? -0.281*** 0.038 
  [-6.14] [0.99] 
Political - -0.189** -0.002 
  [-1.97] [-0.02] 
Market_Index ? -0.019 0.142*** 
  [-0.70] [6.23] 
    
RMSE + RMSExLow_Rate  ?  -0.006 
   [-0.06] 
RMSE + RMSExTax_Enforcement  ?  11.194*** 
   [7.07] 
    
Adjusted R-squared  0.512 0.670 
 
Industry dummies and year dummies are included, but are not reported for brevity. 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
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TABLE 6 
Robustness Test: Differential Tax Rate is Calculated under Various Definitions 
 
Diff_ETRs are calculated under three definitions (See Appendix 1)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Expected 
Sign 
Diff_ETR 
(See Table 5 
column 2) 
Coeff/[t-value] 
Diff_ETR1 
 
Coeff/[t-value] 
 
Diff_ETR2 
 
Coeff/[t-value] 
Diff_ETR3 
 
Coeff/[t-value] 
Constant ? 12.617*** 12.738*** 12.374*** 14.028*** 
  [10.70] [9.83] [9.48] [9.53] 
RMSE + 11.205*** 11.229*** 11.261*** 11.313*** 
  [7.03] [7.07] [6.79] [4.86] 
Low_Rate - -6.118*** -6.120*** -6.103*** -6.122*** 
  [-5.40] [-5.38] [-5.31] [-3.68] 
Tax_Enforcement - -0.310*** -0.278*** -0.261*** -0.337** 
  [-3.67] [-3.27] [-3.89] [-2.47] 
RMSExLow_Rate - -11.211*** -11.229*** -11.250*** -11.161*** 
  [-9.29] [-9.39] [-8.86] [-5.47] 
RMSExTax_Enforcement - -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 
  [-3.21] [-3.03] [-2.68] [-3.16] 
DAccrual ? 0.617 0.617 0.613 -0.219 
  [1.47] [1.47] [1.41] [-0.22] 
Opinion - -0.837*** -0.858*** -0.875*** -0.948*** 
  [-5.40] [-5.55] [-5.54] [-4.29] 
Ind_Dir - 1.738 2.716 3.042 1.491 
  [0.85] [1.33] [1.47] [0.52] 
Dual_Role + -0.026 -0.055 -0.069 -0.040 
  [-0.26] [-0.53] [-0.64] [-0.33] 
Ownership - -0.726*** -0.701*** -0.717*** -0.935*** 
  [-7.96] [-7.65] [-7.63] [-5.85] 
Exe_Shares ? 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
  [0.39] [0.50] [0.59] [0.14] 
Overseas_Shares + 1.107*** 1.109*** 1.113*** 0.987*** 
  [4.88] [4.93] [4.93] [4.00] 
Rights_Issue - -0.560*** -0.546*** -0.515*** -0.425** 
  [-3.58] [-3.50] [-3.30] [-2.30] 
ROE - -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 
  [-1.28] [-1.25] [-1.22] [-0.90] 
Leverage ? 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.051*** -0.209 
  [3.50] [3.47] [3.44] [-1.12] 
Age ? 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 
  [3.64] [3.78] [3.88] [2.76] 
Cosize ? 0.038 0.034 0.045 0.003 
  [0.99] [0.88] [1.17] [0.06] 
Political - -0.002 0.019 0.003 -0.017 
  [-0.02] [0.23] [0.04] [-0.13] 
Market_Index ? 0.142*** 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.160*** 
  [6.23] [5.73] [5.58] [4.86] 
      
 
RMSE +  
RMSE_Low_Rate 
 
 
? 
 
-0.006 
[-0.06] 
 
0.001 
[0.01] 
 
0.011 
[0.09] 
 
0.152 
[0.99] 
 
RMSE + 
RMSE_Tax_Enforcement 
 
 
? 
 
11.194*** 
[7.07] 
 
11.218*** 
[7.12] 
 
11.251*** 
[6.84] 
 
11.300*** 
[4.87] 
      
Observations  17,163 17,163 17,163 16,995 
Adjusted R-squared  0.670 0.664 0.654 0.470 
 
Industry dummies and year dummies are included, but are not reported for brevity.  
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 7 
Robustness Test: A Lower Tax Rate is Redefined under Various Definitions  
A lower tax rate is defined using different cut-off rates:33 percent in column 1  
and 15 percent in column 2 
  (1) 33 % rate (2) 15% rate 
 
N=17,163 
Expected 
Sign 
Diff_ETR 
Coeff/[t-value] 
Diff_ETR 
Coeff/[t-value] 
Constant ? 13.055*** 23.533*** 
  [11.05] [22.80] 
RMSE + 11.172*** 5.935*** 
  [7.03] [4.57] 
Low_Rate - -6.222*** -6.641*** 
  [-5.50] [-7.38] 
Tax_Enforcement - -0.279*** -0.167** 
  [-3.30] [-2.10] 
RMSExLow_Rate - -11.162*** -8.990*** 
  [-9.29] [-9.44] 
RMSExTax_Enforcement - -0.010*** -0.005** 
  [-2.94] [-2.23] 
DAccrual ? 0.624 -0.277 
  [1.49] [-0.76] 
Opinion - -0.823*** -0.243 
  [-5.31] [-1.70] 
Ind_Dir - 0.939 -1.662 
  [0.46] [-0.92] 
Dual_Role + -0.042 -0.034 
  [-0.42] [-0.38] 
Ownership - -0.714*** -1.801*** 
  [-7.81] [-9.88] 
Exe_Shares ? 0.001 0.003 
  [0.16] [0.92] 
Overseas_Shares + 1.121*** 0.825*** 
  [4.93] [3.91] 
Rights_Issue - -0.564*** -0.421*** 
  [-3.59] [-3.12] 
ROE - -0.015 -0.004 
  [-1.26] [-0.49] 
Leverage ? 0.051*** 0.014 
  [3.50] [1.46] 
Age ? 0.032*** 0.265*** 
  [2.89] [2.97] 
Cosize ? 0.032 -0.278*** 
  [0.83] [-8.18] 
Political - 0.017 -0.211*** 
  [0.21] [-2.90] 
Market_Index ? 0.137*** 0.087*** 
  [6.02] [4.19] 
RMSE + RMSExLow_Rate  ? 0.009 -3.055*** 
  [0.08] [-3.72] 
RMSE + RMSExTax_Enforcement  ? 11.162*** 5.930*** 
  [7.07] [4.61] 
Adjusted R-squared  0.669 0.723 
 
Industry dummies and year dummies are included, but are not reported for brevity. 
Column 1: Low_Rate = 1 for samples subject to tax rates lower than 33 percent, and 0 for samples subject to a 
33 percent tax rate. 
Column 2: Low_Rate = 1 for samples subject to tax rates of 15 percent or lower, and 0 for samples subject to 
tax rates higher than 15 percent. 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 8 
Robustness Test: Samples Subject to Reduced Rate  
Preferential Treatment Are Excluded 
 
Low_Rate = 1 for samples subject to a tax rate of 25 percent, and 0 for samples subject to  
a tax rate of 33 percent (i.e., excluding samples subject to reduced tax rate preferential treatment). 
 
N=7,713 
Expected 
Sign 
Diff_ETR 
Coeff/[t-value] 
Constant ? 16.661*** 
  [12.49] 
RMSE + 5.693*** 
  [4.13] 
Low_Rate - -6.360*** 
  [-8.26] 
Tax_Enforcement - -0.079** 
  [-2.36] 
RMSExLow_Rate - -6.453*** 
  [-5.81] 
RMSExTax_Enforcement - -0.007*** 
  [-4.62] 
DAccrual ? 0.269 
  [1.71] 
Opinion - 0.017 
  [0.25] 
Ind_Dir - -1.045 
  [-0.10] 
Dual_Role + -0.033 
  [-0.85] 
Ownership - -2.150*** 
  [-4.60] 
Exe_Shares ? -0.006*** 
  [-4.04] 
Overseas_Shares + 0.091 
  [1.22] 
Rights_Issue - -0.120** 
  [-2.52] 
ROE - -0.003 
  [-0.58] 
Leverage ? 0.020** 
  [2.42] 
Age ? 0.067*** 
  [3.06] 
Cosize ? -0.077*** 
  [-5.73] 
Political - -0.058 
  [-1.81] 
Market_Index ? 0.149*** 
  [7.62] 
RMSE + RMSExLow_Rate  ? -0.760*** 
  [-3.12] 
RMSE + RMSExTax_Enforcement  ? 5.686*** 
  [4.113] 
Adjusted R-squared  0.702 
  
Industry dummies and year dummies are included, but are not reported for brevity. 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 9  
Robustness Test: Tax Enforcement is Measured by the  
Likelihood of Being Tax Audited 
 
Tax_Enforcement is measured by the likelihood of being tax audited. This variable is coded as 1 
 if it is higher than sample median, and 0 if it is lower than sample median.  
 
N=17,163 
Expected 
Sign 
Diff_ETR 
Coeff/[t-value] 
Constant ? 14.820*** 
  [12.49] 
RMSE + 10.714*** 
  [6.45] 
Low_Rate - -6.109*** 
  [-5.43] 
Tax_Enforcement - -0.676*** 
  [-10.56] 
RMSExLow_Rate - -11.571*** 
  [-9.19] 
RMSExTax_Enforcement - -0.015*** 
  [-3.53] 
DAccrual ? 0.611 
  [1.46] 
Opinion - -0.826*** 
  [-5.34] 
Ind_Dir - 1.180 
  [0.58] 
Dual_Role + -0.087 
  [-0.87] 
Ownership - -0.945*** 
  [-10.23] 
Exe_Shares ? -0.001 
  [-0.33] 
Overseas_Shares + 1.118*** 
  [4.99] 
Rights_Issue - -0.536*** 
  [-3.44] 
ROE - -0.012 
  [-0.96] 
Leverage ? 0.051*** 
  [3.48] 
Age ? 0.034*** 
  [3.12] 
Cosize ? 0.006 
  [0.15] 
Political - 0.001 
  [0.02] 
Market_Index ? -0.000 
  [-0.01] 
RMSE + RMSExLow_Rate  ? -0.857*** 
  [-6.00] 
RMSE + RMSExTax_Enforcement  ? 10.699*** 
  [6.37] 
Adjusted R-squared  0.671 
  
Industry dummies and year dummies are included, but are not reported for brevity. 
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 10  
Tax Rate Effect and Tax Enforcement Effect at Different Book-Tax Conformity Levels 
 RMSE is coded as 1 if the value is higher than its median, and 0 if it is lower than its median.  
 
N=17,163 
Expected 
Sign 
Diff_ETR 
Coeff/[t-value] 
Constant ? 16.190*** 
  [12.53] 
RMSE + 7.568*** 
  [5.31] 
Low_Rate - -8.905*** 
  [-7.78] 
Tax_Enforcement - -0.237** 
  [-2.47] 
RMSExLow_Rate - -8.155*** 
  [-7.05] 
RMSExTax_Enforcement - -0.015*** 
  [-3.00] 
DAccrual ? 0.584 
  [1.27] 
Opinion - -0.772*** 
  [-4.48] 
Ind_Dir - 1.494 
  [0.66] 
Dual_Role + -0.021 
  [-0.19] 
Ownership - -1.647*** 
  [-5.06] 
Exe_Shares ? -0.001 
  [-0.19] 
Overseas_Shares + 1.482*** 
  [5.96] 
Rights_Issue - -0.655*** 
  [-3.75] 
ROE - -0.007 
  [-0.64] 
Leverage ? 0.051*** 
  [3.22] 
Age ? 0.071*** 
  [6.04] 
Cosize ? -0.079 
  [-1.89] 
Political - -0.084 
  [-0.94] 
Market_Index ? 0.097*** 
  [3.83] 
   
   
RMSE + RMSExLow_Rate  ? -0.587*** 
  [-0.42] 
RMSE + RMSExTax_Enforcement  ? 7.553*** 
  [5.42] 
   
Low_Rate + RMSExLow_Rate  ? -17.060*** 
  [-9.56] 
Tax_Enforcement+ 
RMSExTax_Enforcement  
? -0.252*** 
[-2.63] 
Adjusted R-squared  0.585 
Industry dummies and year dummies are included, but are not reported for brevity.  
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 11  
The Influence of Adopting both Lower Tax Rates and  
More Stringent Tax Enforcement on the Delinking Effect 
N=17,163 Exp. Sign Diff_ETR Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Intercept ? 12.430*** 
  [10.53] 
RMSE + 11.197*** 
  [7.03] 
Low_Rate - -6.110*** 
  [-5.39] 
Tax_Enforcement - -0.699*** 
  [-6.19] 
RMSE x Low_Rate - -11.021*** 
  [-8.61] 
RMSE x Tax_Enforcement - -0.009*** 
  [-2.69] 
RMSE x Low_Rate x Tax_Enforcement - -0.514*** 
  [-4.27] 
DAccrual ? 0.636 
  [1.51] 
Opinion - -0.839*** 
  [-5.41] 
Ind_Dir - 1.781 
  [0.88] 
Dual_Role + -0.029 
  [-0.29] 
Ownership - -0.708*** 
  [-7.75] 
Exe_Shares ? 0.001 
  [0.39] 
Overseas_Shares + 1.103*** 
  [4.87] 
Rights_Issue - -0.551*** 
  [-3.53] 
ROE - -0.015 
  [-1.24] 
Leverage ? 0.051*** 
  [3.48] 
Age ? 0.042*** 
  [3.76] 
Cosize ? 0.038 
  [1.00] 
Political - 0.001 
  [0.02] 
Market_Index ? 0.141*** 
  [6.20] 
   
RMSE + RMSExLow_Rate ? 0.176 
  [1.42] 
RMSE + RMSExTax_Enforcement ? 11.188*** 
  [7.08] 
   
RMSE + RMSExLow_Rate + RMSEx Tax_Enforcement + 
RMSExLow_RatexTax_Enforcement  
? -0.347** 
[-2.50] 
   
RMSExLow_Rate + RMSExTax_Enforcement 
 + RMSExLow_RatexTax Enforcement  
? -11.544*** 
[-8.03] 
Adjusted R-squared  0.670 
Industry dummies and year dummies are included, but are not reported for brevity.  
*** and ** indicate two-tailed significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Definition of Variables 
 
Diff_ETR = difference between the statutory tax rate (STR) and the effective tax rate (ETR), 
where ETR = Income Tax Expense / Profit Before Tax. A larger Diff-ETR denotes 
more tax noncompliance. 
Diff_ETR1 = difference between the statutory tax rate (STR) and the effective tax rate 1 (ETR1), 
where ETR1 = Income Tax Expense / (Profit Before Tax + Impairment Loss - 
Investment Income). A larger Diff-ETR denotes more tax noncompliance.  
Diff_ETR2 = difference between the statutory tax rate (STR) and the effective tax rate 2 (ETR2), 
where ETR2 = (Income Tax Expense - Deferred Income Tax Expense) / (Profit 
Before Tax + Impairment Loss - Investment Income). A larger Diff-ETR denotes 
more tax noncompliance. 
Diff_ETR3 = difference between the statutory tax rate (STR) and the effective tax rate 3 (ETR3), 
where ETR3 = (Income Tax Expense – Deferred Income Tax Expense) / Cash Flow 
from Operation. A larger Diff-ETR denotes more tax noncompliance. 
RMSE = root mean squared error derived from the regression of current tax expense on pretax 
book income and dividend declared in a given year (Atwood et al. 2010). The higher 
the value of RMSE, the lower the book-tax conformity. 
Low_Rate = 1 for samples subject to statutory corporate tax rate of 25 percent or lower, 0 for 
samples subject to tax rate of higher than 25 percent.  
Tax_Enforcement = 1 if the average ranking of the sum of the ranks for Tax_Audit, Qualification, 
Audit_Results is above the country level median, 0 otherwise. Regional tax 
enforcement measures adopted by tax authorities in China.  
DAccrual = discretionary accrual of a company based on the modified Jones (1991) model. 
Opinion = 1 if a company receives an unqualified audit opinion in the year, 0 otherwise. 
Ind_Dir = number of independent directors over the total number of directors on the board. 
Dual_Role = 1 if the Chairman and the CEO of a company is the same person, 0 otherwise 
Ownership = 1 if a company is SOEs, 0 otherwise 
Exe_Shares = number of shares held by senior executives divided by total number of shares of the 
company at the end of the year. 
Overseas_Shares = 1 if a company has shares listed in an overseas stock exchange, 0 otherwise. 
Rights_Issue = 1 if a company raises additional capital in the succeeding year, 0 otherwise. 
ROE = the ratio of net income before tax to equity. 
Leverage = total debts divided by total assets at the end of the year. 
Age = number of years of operation since the initial public offering of the firm. 
Cosize = the natural logarithm of a company’s year-end total assets. 
Political = 1 if both the Chief Executive Officer and the General Manager of a company have 
political appointments in China, 0 otherwise. 
Market_Index = Composite index reflecting the market development calculated from the following 
five aspects: (1) the relationship between government and market, such as the role of 
markets in allocating resources and enterprise burden in addition to normal taxes; (2) 
the development of non-state business, such as the ratio of industrial output by the 
private sector to total industrial outputs; (3) the development of product markets, 
such as regional trade barriers; (4) the development of factor markets such as foreign 
direct investment and the mobility of labor; and (5) the development of market 
intermediaries (including auditors) and legal environment (Fan and Wang (2001 to 
2009). A higher index suggests a more developed market. 
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APPENDIX 2  Pearson Correlation Table for the Independent Variables Used in the Main Regression 
Coeff//p-value (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
RMSE (1) 1.000 
                Low_Rate (2) 0.167 1.000 
               
 
0.000 
                Tax_Enforcement (3) -0.019 -0.046 1.000 
              
 
0.008 0.000 
               DAccrual (4) -0.014 -0.008 -0.009 1.000 
             
 
0.056 0.304 0.218 
              Opinion (5) 0.062 0.048 -0.027 0.147 1.000 
            
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
             Ind_Dir (6) 0.162 0.081 -0.026 -0.015 0.005 1.000 
           
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.496 
            Dual_Role (7) 0.082 0.058 -0.058 0.012 -0.005 0.076 1.000 
          
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.093 0.456 0.000 
           Ownership (8) 0.455 0.315 -0.100 0.006 0.094 0.193 0.092 1.000 
         
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          Exe_Shares (9) 0.177 0.136 -0.112 0.076 0.084 0.088 0.230 0.201 1.000 
        
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
         Overseas_Shares (10) 0.003 0.026 -0.047 -0.019 0.019 0.043 -0.052 0.006 -0.059 1.000 
       
 
0.722 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.406 0.000 
        Rights_Issue (11) 0.009 0.045 0.018 0.047 0.059 0.000 -0.019 0.055 -0.033 0.000 1.000 
      
 
0.207 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.976 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.993 
       ROE (12) 0.007 0.003 -0.012 0.012 -0.009 0.011 0.021 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.002 1.000 
     
 
0.368 0.693 0.097 0.115 0.205 0.136 0.005 0.078 0.938 0.859 0.814 
      Leverage (13) -0.003 -0.004 0.006 -0.056 -0.171 0.034 -0.003 -0.010 -0.043 0.000 -0.010 -0.100 1.000 
    
 
0.663 0.623 0.397 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.697 0.159 0.000 0.988 0.158 0.000 
     Age (14) 0.188 0.110 0.045 -0.108 -0.110 0.064 -0.123 0.202 -0.392 -0.021 0.044 0.012 0.075 1.000 
   
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.099 0.000 
    Cosize (15) 0.147 0.105 -0.060 0.013 0.225 0.067 -0.123 0.167 -0.127 0.389 0.144 0.002 -0.120 0.129 1.000 
  
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.790 0.000 0.000 
   Political (16) -0.028 0.004 0.025 0.021 0.063 -0.022 0.113 -0.037 -0.042 -0.006 0.014 0.012 -0.012 -0.005 0.120 1.000 
 
 
0.000 0.547 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.447 0.063 0.100 0.094 0.495 0.000 
  Market_Index (17) 0.291 0.187 -0.441 0.012 0.082 0.122 0.122 0.421 0.246 0.063 -0.003 0.009 -0.012 0.091 0.151 -0.056 1.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.659 0.219 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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APPENDIX 3 
Panel A: Time Series of RMSE for the Years from 2001 to 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Regression Results of RMSE on Year, Showing the Overall Increasing Trend of RMSE from 2001 to 2012 
 
 Expected
Sign 
RMSE 
Coeff/(t-statistic) 
Year + 0.0005*** 
  [6.61] 
   
Adjusted R-squared  0.795 
 
*** indicates two-tailed significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Panel C: Comparison of Mean Values of RMSE in the Pre-2007 and Post-2007 Periods 
 
 Pre-2007 Post-2007 t-statistic p-value  
 Mean Mean     (Standard deviation) (Standard deviation)    RMSE 0.0102 0.0132 -3.4649 0.005 *** 
 (0.0014) (0.0015)    
 
*** indicates two-tailed significance at the 1 percent level.
Year 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
RMSE 
 
0.0088 0.0081 0.0099 0.0112 0.0115 0.0114 0.0131 0.0116 0.0125 0.0127 0.0129 0.0161 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Calculations for the Economic Significance of Using Lower Tax Rates and 
Stricter Tax Enforcement to Reduce Under-reported Tax Liabilities 
 
 Reduction of Under-reported Tax 
Liabilities in the amount of: 
(per firm year on average, in RMB) 
 
 
Use of Lower Statutory Tax Rate  
(see note 1 below) 
 
 
5.99 million 
 
 
Use of Stricter Tax Enforcement  
(see note 2 below) 
 
 
0.1 million 
 
 
Note: The calculation of the economic significance is as follows: 
 
1. Reduction of under-reported tax liabilities (i.e., increase in reported tax burden) 
when statutory tax rate is reduced by 1 percent (per firm year on average)  
 
= Average profits before tax during the sample years (per firm-year) x 
coefficient of RMSExLow_Rate x (1/ difference between mean tax rate for the 
high and the low tax rate group) 
 
= 802 x (11.211/100) x (1/15) 
= 5.99 
 
2. Reduction of under-reported tax liabilities when stricter tax enforcement (high 
vs. low) is adopted (per firm year on average)  
 
= Average profits before tax during the sample years (per firm-year) x 
coefficient of RMSExTax_Enforcement 
 
= 802 x (0.011/100)  
= 0.1 
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